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Abstract 
 
While public intervention in R&D is generally supported by economic theory 
and R&D subsidies are being increasingly implemented in most OECD countries, 
empirical evidence on their effectiveness has failed to produce conclusive results so far. 
A central question in the related literature is the allocation process of public funds since 
the participation in a R&D programme is not random and there is a potential selection 
bias when assessing the effects of public subsidies. In this research, we aim to analyse 
the participation of firms and S&T organisations in R&D subsidy programmes by 
identifying the determinants of obtaining a subsidy. Using data from two R&D funding 
instruments in Portugal, we provide evidence for the case of an innovation follower 
country, contributing to fill a gap in the related literature. In order to do this, we present 
a characterisation of the project applications made by firms or S&T organisations to the 
subsidy programmes, and we estimate a binary discrete model in order to investigate the 
main determinants of project approval. Our results suggest that subsidies awarded to 
firms are mainly aimed at large R&D projects by manufacturing firms, in both high 
technology sectors and in low-technology sectors that are important in the national and 
regional economic context. On the other hand, subsidies awarded to S&T organisations 
show a higher degree of selectivity, targeting mainly universities and premium public 
research centres, as well as privileging R&D projects in the exact sciences and 
engineering domains and cooperation projects. Finally, we have also found that the 
subsidy allocation process in Portugal presents some distinctive features compared to 
most countries mentioned in the related literature, which are in line with the Portuguese 
level of technological development and its current status of a follower country. 
 
Keywords: R&D, innovation policy, subsidy allocation 
JEL-codes: O31; 038 
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Resumo 
 
A intervenção pública no domínio da I&D é geralmente sustentada pela teoria 
económica e os subsídios à I&D são cada vez mais frequentemente implementados nos 
países da OCDE. No entanto, a literatura empírica acerca da sua eficácia não produziu 
resultados conclusivos até ao momento. Uma questão central nesta literatura é o 
processo de alocação dos fundos públicos, uma vez que a participação em programas de 
subsídios à I&D não é aleatória e há um potencial enviesamento na seleção. Nesta 
dissertação, o nosso objetivo é analisar a participação das empresas e das instituições de 
ciência e tecnologia em programas de subsídios à I&D, identificando os determinantes 
da obtenção de um subsídio. Usando dados acerca de dois instrumentos de 
financiamento da I&D em Portugal, apresentamos o caso de um país seguidor em 
inovação, contribuindo, assim, para preencher uma lacuna na literatura existente. A 
nossa análise inclui uma caracterização das candidaturas de projetos de I&D a estes 
programas e a estimação de um modelo de escolha binária de modo a investigar os 
principais determinantes da aprovação do projeto, quer para o caso das empresas, quer 
para o caso das instituições de ciência e tecnologia. Os resultados sugerem que os 
subsídios atribuídos a empresas são principalmente direcionados para grandes 
investimentos em I&D realizados por empresas transformadoras, tanto em sectores de 
elevada intensidade tecnológica como em sectores de baixa intensidade tecnológica com 
relevância para a economia nacional ou regional. Por outro lado, os subsídios atribuídos 
a instituições de ciência e tecnologia demonstram maior grau de seletividade, sendo 
principalmente direcionados para universidades e laboratórios associados, e 
privilegiando projetos de I&D nas áreas das ciências exatas e engenharia, bem como 
projetos em cooperação. Por fim, os nossos resultados mostram que o processo de 
alocação de subsídios à I&D em Portugal tem algumas características distintas da 
maioria dos países líder referenciados na literatura, o que se relaciona com o nível de 
desenvolvimento tecnológico português e o estatuto de Portugal enquanto país seguidor. 
 
Palavras-chave: I&D, política de inovação, alocação de subsídios 
Classificação JEL: O31; 038 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
Public funding of Research and Development (R&D) is a widely implemented 
tool in national innovation policies. In most OECD countries, the government-
performed R&D represents a relatively small part of R&D expenditures (12% of 
OECD’s gross domestic expenditure on R&D is performed directly in the government 
sector). Nevertheless, governments are a major financer of higher education and 
business-performed R&D. For instance, in the OECD area governments are responsible 
for funding almost 9% of business R&D (OECD, 2013).
1
 
Economic theory justifies public intervention in R&D activities claiming that the 
social return of R&D is higher than the private return (Arrow, 1962), a hypothesis that 
is supported by the empirical evidence (e.g., Griliches, 1992; Jones and Williams, 
1998).  
However, the existing empirical literature on the effectiveness of R&D policy 
measures – especially direct subsidies to firms – has offered inconclusive findings, 
often reporting conflicting results of complementarity or substitutability between public 
and private R&D spending (David et al., 2000; Cerulli, 2010). David et al. (2000) have 
argued that, because there is a potential selection bias in the public funds allocation, any 
attempt to assess the effectiveness of a R&D subsidy programme must first include a 
study of the factors that might influence the probability of receiving a subsidy.  
In this dissertation we concentrate our efforts on this first step, by characterising 
the organisations that apply for and participate in R&D subsidy instruments, as well as 
analysing what factors determine the probability of receiving a subsidy. We focus not 
only on firms, but also address the participation of Science & Technology (S&T) 
organisations, such as universities, in competitive R&D funding programmes. In order 
to do this, we will analyse two R&D funding instruments of the Portuguese National 
Strategic Reference Framework: the Incentive System for Research and Technology 
Development in firms (SI I&DT) and the Science and Technology Organisations 
Support System (SAESCTN). 
The SAESCTN is a support system that comes in the wake of technology push 
based programmes that have been implemented since the late 1980s. This instrument is 
                                                        
1
 Data refer to the year 2011. 
 
 
 
 
2 
aimed at improving and strengthening the Science & Technology (S&T) system in 
Portugal, particularly public and higher education R&D organisations as well as other 
non-profit research organisations, making it more competitive and encouraging the 
linkages between S&T organisations and firms. The SI I&DT is aimed at increasing 
firms' competitiveness by stimulating technology R&D efforts, and fostering 
articulation between firms and organisations in the Science & Technology system.  
The contribution of this dissertation is three-fold. First, we provide an extensive 
characterisation of all project applications to the SAESCTN and SI I&DT instruments 
over the 2008-2012 period. Second, we estimate a binary discrete model in order to 
analyse the main determinants of project approval based on the information available in 
both types of instruments. Third, to the best of our knowledge, most studies on firm 
participation in R&D subsidy programmes are focused on leader countries. Therefore, 
our study of a follower country contributes to fill in a gap in the related literature. 
Furthermore, with the exception of Geuna (1998), we could not find previous studies 
that address the participation of S&T organisations in competitive R&D subsidy 
schemes. 
The outline of this dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 presents a review of the 
relevant literature. Chapter 3 includes a brief characterisation of the innovation system 
and R&D policy in Portugal. In Chapter 4 we present our data and characterise project 
applications to the selected programmes. In Chapter 5 we analyse the determinants of 
project approval based on the estimation of a probit model. Chapter 6 concludes, 
providing a summary of key findings and limitations and gives suggestions for future 
research. 
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Chapter 2 – R&D Policy and the Determinants of Participation in 
R&D Subsidy Programmes: a Literature Review 
 
2.1. The Rationale for a Public R&D Policy  
Public funding of Research and Development (R&D) is a widely implemented 
tool in national innovation policies. Public intervention in the field of research has been 
defended in economic theory due to the existence of two market failures associated with 
R&D: imperfect appropriability of knowledge and capital market limitations. 
The neoclassical theory suggests that, because the primary output of R&D 
activities – knowledge – has public good features, the level of private R&D expenditure 
will be lower than the socially optimal level (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962). Knowledge 
is non-rival and (at least in part) non-excludable, in the sense that the use of a certain 
piece of knowledge by one individual does not reduce the amount available to others (or 
its quality) and that an individual cannot be effectively excluded from its use by others. 
Because of these characteristics, individuals or firms that invest in R&D to 
produce knowledge will not be able to completely appropriate its results, as others, who 
have not invested, will also be able, to some extent, to use the results of the R&D. The 
existence of positive externalities of R&D means that private firms are likely to 
underinvest in R&D because the benefits are hard to fully appropriate, and, therefore, 
the level of private R&D will be systematically lower than the socially optimal (Arrow, 
1962). Many authors have found empirical support to the positive externalities 
argument, observing a social return to R&D higher than the private level (Griliches, 
1992; Jones and Williams, 1998). 
However, there are several criticisms to the “positive externalities” argument, 
specifically challenging the definition of knowledge as non-excludable.  
Some authors have argued that R&D should not be considered a pure public 
good since a number of tools, such as patents or secrecy, can be employed to protect its 
results, therefore correcting the market failure that arises from the externalities (e.g., 
Cerulli, 2010). However, it is not conceivable that legal protection can entirely 
transform intangible knowledge into an excludable and fully appropriable commodity 
(Arrow, 1962). Several notable advances in scientific knowledge, namely those that 
 
 
 
 
4 
result from basic research, are not directly applicable to patentable solutions. In such 
cases, it is unlikely that a private firm is able to capture the full economic value of a 
R&D project through patent rights, therefore lacking incentive to undertake such R&D 
activities (Nelson, 1959). Moreover, since knowledge is not only the output of R&D 
activities but also an input to further research, even if legal protection could completely 
restrict the diffusion of knowledge, it would only reduce the efficiency of research and 
the quantity of R&D activity in general (Arrow, 1962).  
A second line of thought points out that even unprotected knowledge cannot so 
easily and costlessly be absorbed or imitated by other firms as the positive externality 
argument seems to imply. Some authors have found that the direct cost of imitation can 
go up to 50-75% of the cost of the original invention (Hall, 2002). Furthermore, 
evolutionary scholars have argued that a firm’s ability to understand and use external 
knowledge is influenced by the firm’s “absorptive capacity”. This term was coined by 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) to explain that “the ability to evaluate and utilise outside 
knowledge is largely a function of the level of prior related knowledge. At the most 
elemental level, this prior knowledge includes basic skills or even a shared language but 
may also include knowledge of the most recent scientific or technological developments 
in a given field. Thus, prior related knowledge confers an ability to recognise the value 
of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends. These abilities 
collectively constitute what we call a firm's absorptive capacity" (p.128). This argument 
not only implies that free-rider firms might not be able to fully capture the spillover 
effects of R&D, resulting in lower externalities, but also that firms have an incentive to 
engage in R&D activities in order to expand their own absorptive capacity, 
counteracting the negative effect of externalities on the private level of R&D. 
Therefore, one cannot determine a priori whether the net effect will result in a private 
level of R&D expenditure below, equal or above the socially optimal level. 
In addition to imperfect appropriability, a second market failure lies in the 
existence of capital market imperfections, generating a gap between the private rate of 
return and the cost of external capital. This suggests that, even in the absence of 
externalities, when firms do not have the financial assets to fund their own R&D 
activities some innovations will not be developed due to the high cost of external capital 
(Clausen, 2009). 
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The relative lack of external funding for R&D activities arises mostly from the 
uncertainty associated with such activities. R&D projects usually entail a higher risk 
than most alternative firm investments. Furthermore, the intangible nature of its output 
– knowledge – means that it cannot easily be used as collateral to secure a loan (Alonso-
Borrego et al., 2012). The higher uncertainty associated with basic research also means 
that external investors may prefer to finance applied research or development projects 
and short-term projects. Also, asymmetric information between the inventor and the 
investor is commonly pointed as a reason for the gap between external and internal 
costs of capital in economic theory. In the context of R&D activities, the inventor is 
likely to have better information about the probability of success than the potential 
investors. Moreover, due to the strategic nature of R&D and the already discussed 
appropriability concerns, the inventor is likely reluctant to fully disclose innovative 
ideas to external entities (Hall, 2002).  
In recent years, venture capital and other forms of early-stage capital have arisen 
in response to this issue, however several limitations still hinder its effectiveness. For 
instance, minimum investments are often required, which may be too large for start-up 
firms and small firms. Also, the success of the venture capital sector depends on the 
existence of a well-developed stock market that provides an exit strategy for investors 
(Black and Gilson, 1999). 
To sum up this theoretical debate, the existence of market failures is accepted as 
the main justification for public expenditure in R&D. Despite the criticisms to the 
definition of scientific knowledge as a public good which lessen the “positive 
externalities” argument, it is still widely acknowledged that private efforts alone are not 
likely to match the socially optimal level of R&D expenditure.  
 
2.2. R&D Policy Instruments 
Public R&D policy instruments usually include public performed research, 
government funding of business R&D and fiscal incentives.
2
 Public performed research 
is usually carried out in public laboratories or universities and aimed at satisfying public 
needs and ensuring the provision of new knowledge (Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe de 
                                                        
2
 Public procurement, i.e., the government purchase of R&D services from private firms, can also be 
considered a form of direct public R&D expenditure (David et al., 2000). 
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la Potterie, 2004). Usually, public laboratories are funded essentially by the government 
and focus on a nationally defined research agenda, traditionally in fields such as health, 
defence or energy (Dalpe, 1993). Universities are more independent and less responsive 
to research policy than public laboratories, since these institutions follow their own 
research agendas (Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2004). Nevertheless, 
higher education institutions have been very important players in the generation of basic 
knowledge (Salter and Martin, 2001), and, with the increasing trend to reinforce the ties 
between industry and universities, the latter has an increasingly important role in 
applied research and development projects (Cohen et al., 2002). Furthermore, it has 
been reasoned that public performed research contributes to economic growth not only 
by increasing the stock of knowledge, but also by training skilled graduates and 
researchers, forming scientific networks, creating new scientific instrumentation and 
methodologies, and by creating spin-off firms (Salter and Martin, 2001).  In general, 
empirical studies have shown that academic research has a positive impact in industrial 
R&D, firm productivity and economic growth (e.g., Mansfield 1991, 1998; Martin, 
1998; Cohen et al., 2002).  
The government may also fund business-performed R&D through subsidies or 
grants, or offer fiscal incentives to firms who engage in R&D activities. While subsidies 
and grants raise the private marginal rate of return to R&D investment, tax incentives 
reduce the marginal cost of R&D (David et al., 2000). 
One important difference between subsidies and tax credits is that, through 
subsidy awarding, the government or public agency can choose the R&D project which 
will receive the funding, while tax incentives are applicable regardless of what R&D 
project the firm chooses. However, tax credits also present some inequitable features, 
for instance by favouring larger and more profitable firms. Since tax credits only apply 
to firms who have profits, start-up firms where investment is higher than sales will not 
be able to benefit from the funding. It may also distort the firm’s research agenda by 
introducing an incentive to engage in short-term R&D projects that generate quicker or 
higher paybacks. Consequently, the public intervention introduces an additional 
incentive for firms to perform projects with higher private rates of return rather than 
those with higher social rates of return, which is contrary to the public goal (David et 
al., 2000). Tax credits also do not respond appropriately to the financial market failure, 
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since the credit applies to firms who have internal funds and are less exposed to credit 
constraints (Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2004).  
By offering direct funding through subsidies or grants, the government is able, 
in theory, to choose the projects with the largest gap between the social and private 
return. However, in practice, several problems persist. Usually, the public agency must 
choose R&D projects from a pool of firms who apply for funding, which are not 
necessarily projects with high social rates of return that would not be carried out 
without public support. Asymmetric information and the presence of uncertainty also 
mean that the public agency might not be able to distinguish clearly what projects 
would not be otherwise carried out. Moreover, political pressures to accomplish 
successful results of the funding programme may lead the public agency to offer 
subsidies to R&D projects with higher private marginal rates of return (David et al., 
2000).  
Despite the theoretical reasoning for public funding of R&D, given the 
difficulties that subsist in the operationalisation of support programmes, it is essential to 
show that these programmes are effective. 
 
2.3. The Effectiveness of R&D Subsidy Programmes
3
 
In the last decades, several empirical studies have been carried out in order to 
analyse the effects of public funding on private R&D investment.
4
 Most of these studies 
focus on whether public funding stimulates or crowds out private R&D funding. Public 
funding of R&D may crowd out private spending by two mechanisms. First, firms may 
substitute internal funds for public funds, while performing the same amount of 
research as originally planned. Secondly, there may be crowding out by the price 
mechanism: by funding R&D or conducting public research, the government increases 
R&D investment, rising demand and therefore the price of R&D activities (especially 
the wages of researchers). Consequently, private investment in R&D may decrease as 
firms shift their funds to less costly activities (Goolsbee, 1998). 
                                                        
3
 From now on, we will focus our analysis exclusively on subsidy programmes. For an insightful review 
of the effectiveness of fiscal incentives to R&D see Hall and Van Reenan (2000).  
4
 For a more extensive empirical literature review on this issue see David et al. (2000) and Cerulli (2010). 
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The empirical literature has, so far, produced mixed and inconclusive results. 
While some authors report crowding-out effects (e.g., Busom, 2000; Wallsten, 2000; 
Heijs and Herrera, 2004), others reject the hypothesis that public spending in R&D acts 
as a substitute for private R&D efforts (e.g., Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003; Sorensen et 
al., 2003; Duguet, 2004; Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; Gonzalez and Pazó, 2008). 
This ambiguity of results has been disputably attributed to differences in the 
samples used in the empirical studies. David et al. (2000) point out that studies based on 
firm-level or less aggregated data report a substitution effect more often than industry or 
national level studies; also, the regions considered are likely to influence results, as well 
as the variety of instruments and objectives of government R&D funding. While some 
authors corroborate these findings (e.g., Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; Gonzalez and Pazó, 
2008) others find little or no evidence that different outcomes can consistently be 
explained by sample differences alone (e.g., Garcia-Quevedo, 2004).  
David et al. (2000) have criticised some of the earlier studies for largely 
disregarding a possible selection and endogeneity bias when estimating the effects of 
public subsidies. This problem arises due to the fact that participation in a R&D 
programme is not random, but rather reflects both the firms’ decisions and the public 
agency goals. 
The programme goals may not be achieved if many eligible firms do not apply 
due to the existence of barriers that the public agency is not aware of. For example, it is 
possible that only a set of firms with certain characteristics apply for a subsidy, whether 
because there are application costs that some firms cannot support or because some 
firms have access to better information about policy measures, thus generating a self-
selection effect (Busom, 2000; Aerts and Schmidt, 2008). Furthermore, after the 
application’s stage, the selection of awarded firms is, naturally, biased, as it is usually 
based on an evaluation of the firm or project’s value and compliance with the public 
agency’s goals. For example, it seems plausible that R&D intensive firms are more 
likely to apply for a subsidy. Furthermore, if the public agency follows a “picking the 
winner” strategy it will probably favour firms that are already highly innovative and 
successful. One must then conclude that the award decision by the government and the 
firm’s level of R&D are not independent, but rather, that unobservable factors may 
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determine both the public agency’s subsidy award decision and the firm’s R&D effort 
decision (Busom, 2000).  
In order to appropriately deal with endogeneity and selection issues, one must 
control for the variables that determine the participation and award decision by the 
public agency, in order to identify unexpected barriers to firms, the agencies’ explicit 
and implicit goals, as well as industry or region specific trends that may affect the 
outcomes of the programmes (Blanes and Busom, 2004). Particularly, more recent 
studies on the effectiveness of R&D subsidies have used two-step selection models that 
estimate, in a first step, the firms’ probability of receiving a subsidy, and, on a second 
step, the effect of public funding on private R&D efforts (Hussinger, 2008). 
 
2.4. The Determinants of Participation in a R&D Subsidy Programme 
As mentioned before, in recent years the issue of firms’ participation in R&D 
subsidy programmes has become more important in the empirical literature, although 
only a few studies are concerned with it directly (e.g., Blanes and Busom, 2004; 
Aschhoff, 2010). Most empirical evidence on the determinants of firms’ participation in 
R&D programmes comes from studies concerned with some aspect of programme 
evaluation, since the statistical and econometrical methods generally used in the most 
recent studies (namely, matching methods) require an estimation of the probability of 
participation to account for sample selection issues. 
After a review of the related literature, we have found 18 empirical studies that 
include evidence on the determinants of firms’ participation in R&D subsidy 
programmes. Most of these studies concern evidence from leader countries, including 
Germany, USA, France, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden and Spain. All of these studies use 
microeconomic data, at firm or project-level.   
On the studies we have reviewed, several variables show up as statistically 
significant determinants of firm’s participation in R&D programmes, although in some 
cases the results are ambiguous.  
For example, the firm size is most often an important factor, usually with larger 
firms having more chance of receiving a subsidy. Herrera and Nieto (2008) argue that 
larger firms more often have R&D departments and laboratories, and more critical mass 
of R&D activities, and so are more likely to present clearly designed R&D projects, 
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thus more frequently meeting the requirements of the public agency. Moreover, smaller 
firms may have a more limited R&D management capacity and therefore self-exclude 
from participation. To support this claim, several authors find that firms with formal 
R&D departments or regular R&D activity are more likely to receive a subsidy (Almus 
and Czarnitzki, 2003; Lööf and Heshmati, 2005). However, in what concerns the firm 
size, some authors have found that smaller firms have a higher probability of receiving 
support (Busom, 2000; Fier et al. 2006), arguing that this may be due to a specific 
agency intention to direct funds to smaller firms, as these may be more credit 
constrained. 
Past experience in R&D also affects positively the probability of receiving a 
subsidy, as well as past participations in R&D subsidy programmes (e.g., Duguet, 2004; 
Gonzalez et al., 2005; Aschhoff, 2010). Furthermore, evidence shows that the firm’s 
patent stock or number of patent applications positively influences the probability of 
receiving a subsidy (e.g., Wallsten, 2000; Kaiser, 2006). Authors often use the firm’s 
age as a proxy for the firm’s experience, however it has rarely shown as statistically 
significant and the estimated coefficients have an ambiguous effect (e.g., Gonzalez et 
al., 2005; Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006; Fier et al. 2006).   
Some authors also consider the influence of human capital, frequently measured 
by the firm’s share of qualified employees, which seems to positively influence the 
probability of receiving a subsidy (Blanes and Busom, 2004; Aschhoff, 2010). Aschhoff 
(2010) argues that a larger share of qualified employees contributes to increase the 
firm’s absorptive capacity, expanding the pool of potential R&D projects, and thus such 
firms are more likely to present more promising and profitable R&D projects. 
One factor that seems to reduce the probability of receiving a subsidy is foreign 
ownership of the firm (total or partial), which is likely to reflect the agencies’ explicit or 
implicit preference for supporting domestic firms (e.g., Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; 
Hussinger, 2008). Busom (2000) also argues that in firms with foreign ownership, core 
R&D activities may be located in another country, and local activities may therefore 
have little innovative content. On the other hand, some authors find that some degree of 
public ownership increases the probability of receiving a subsidy (e.g., Herrera and 
Nieto, 2008). 
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Several authors have also found that the probability of receiving a subsidy is 
positively influenced by the export intensity of the firm (Aerts and Czarnitz ki, 2004; 
Aschhoff, 2010) or the market (Heijs and Herrera, 2004). 
Cooperative behavior of the firm or the submission of cooperation projects is 
also likely to increase the probability of receiving a subsidy, which suggests that public 
agencies might prefer to select projects that establish knowledge flows between 
organisations and generate greater knowledge spillovers (Feldman and Kelley, 2006; 
Dumont, 2013). 
Most studies control for sector or industry differences on the firms’ probability 
of receiving a subsidy. The intensity of R&D activities tends to vary between industries, 
due to different technological opportunities and differences in expected demand growth 
within industries, following the well-known typologies of activities set by Pavitt (1984) 
or, for instance, the analysis on sectoral patterns of innovation led by Malerba and 
Orsenigo (1995). Therefore, it is also likely that industry characteristics influence the 
public agency’s decision of awarding a subsidy. Furthermore, the public agency might 
want to encourage R&D in specific research fields or industries, as has frequently been 
the case for health and defence (Busom, 2000). Even though different studies based of 
different samples have often produced distinct results on this matter, there is moderate 
evidence that industries that are more technology intensive have a higher probability of 
receiving a subsidy than low-technology or traditional industries (Busom, 2000; Herrera 
and Nieto, 2008). Table 1 sums up the findings of the reviewed empirical studies on the 
determinants of firms’ participation in a R&D subsidy programme. 
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Table 1. Empirical studies on the determinants of firms’ participation in a R&D subsidy programme 
a
 Statistically significant at conventional levels 
Author 
(year) 
Sample/Data Source Country Independent Variables 
Metho-
dology 
Estimated Effects
a 
Busom  
(2000) 
154 firms conducting R&D 
activities in 1988. 
 
Centro para el Desarrollo 
Tecnológico e Industrial (CDTI)  
Survey 
Spain 
 
 
Firm size (log no. of employees); Age; Export Share; Experience in R&D 
(no. of patents obtained by firm during the previous 10 years); Public 
ownership dummy; Foreign ownership dummy; Price dummy (1 if firm 
declared to set prices and then adjust production to sales); Regulation 
dummy (1 if firm declared prices to be regulated); FRival dummy (1 if firm 
declared it would increase own R&D in response to a rival’s); Shortrun 
dummy (1 if firm declared R&D to be important in the short run); Industry 
dummies (omitted category: Traditional, includes textile, food, metal 
industries) 
Probit 
model 
 
 
Size (-);  Age (+); Public 
Ownership (+);  
Foreign Ownership (-); 
Experience in R&D (+); 
Industries: chemical (+) 
pharmaceutical (+); 
 
Wallsten 
(2000) 
481 manufacturing and services 
firms; 1990-1992 
 
Federal Research in Progress 
database 
USA Size (log no. employees); Age (log years); Instrument budget; No. of prior 
patent applications; Public ownership dummy; Minority ownership dummy 
(1 if no shareholder has majority of shares); Industry dummies (not 
reported); Region dummies (not reported) 
3-stage 
OLS 
Instrument budget (+); Prior 
patent applications (+) 
Almus and 
Czarnitzki 
(2003) 
925 manufacturing firms; 
1995, 1997, and 1999 
 
Mannheim Innovation 
Panel 
Eastern 
Germany 
Firm size (log of the no. of employees); Age; Capital intensity; West 
German dummy; Foreign ownership dummy, Export ratio; Import ratio; 
Seller’s concentration; Market share; R&D department dummy; Legal form 
dummy; Industry dummies (omitted category: Food and beverages) 
 
Probit 
model 
Size (+); Foreign ownership (-); 
R&D department (+); Seller’s 
concentration (-); Industries: 
Fuels and chemicals(+), 
Machinery and equipment(+), 
Office and communication 
equipment(+), electrical 
machinery and components(+), 
Medical and optical instrument 
(+), Motor vehicles and other 
transport equipment(+) 
Aerts and 
Czarnitzki 
(2004) 
776 firms; 1998-2000 
 
CIS III 
Belfirst database 
Belgium 
(Flanders) 
Size (log no of employees); Patent stock/employee; Export quota;  Foreign 
ownership dummy; Group dummy (1 if firm belongs to a group); Capital 
intensity; Debt/total assets; Cash flow/employees 
Probit 
model 
Size (+); Patent stock/employee 
(+); Foreign ownership (-); 
Export quota (+) 
Blanes and 
Busom 
 (2004) 
Chemical and pharmaceutical 
firms 
 
Survey on Business Strategies 
(ESEE) 
Spain Experience in R&D; Age; Human Capital (percentage of university 
graduates); Size (no. of employees); Cash-flow; Domestic dummy (1 if firm 
is fully domestic); Traded dummy (1 if the firm is publicly traded, i.e., is 
listed in the stock exchange) 
Multi-
nomial 
logit 
model  
Firm Size (+); Human Capital 
(+); Domestic Firm (+) 
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Table 1. Empirical studies on the determinants of firms’ participation in a R&D subsidy programme (continued) 
a
 Statistically significant at conventional levels 
 
Duguet 
(2004) 
12 two-year samples concerning 
between 1032 and 1672 industry 
and services firms, 1985-1997 
 
Marchés et Stratégies Entreprises 
(INSEE) 
R&D survey (Ministry of 
Research) 
France Past subsidy dummy; Average of log past subsidy rates; Log Private 
R&D/Sales; Log Debt/Sales; Size (Log Sales); Industry dummies 
Logit 
model 
Size (+); Private R&D/Sales (+); 
Debt/Sales (+); Past subsidy (+) 
 
Heijs and 
Herrera 
(2004) 
681 firms, 1998-2000 
 
Business Strategy Survey 
(Encuesta sobre Estrategias 
Empresariales – ESEE) 
Spain Size (log no. of employees); Region dummies (1 if central, 0 if peripheral); 
Age; Industry dummies (omitted category: producers of traditional 
consumer goods); Foreign ownership (% foreign capital); Public ownership 
(% public capital); Other firms capital (%); Market dummies (growing, 
steady, shrinking); Market share dummies (growing, steady, shrinking); 
Diversification (Avg. no. of goods produced by firm); Export propensity 
(Avg. exports/Avg. sales); Import propensity (Avg. imports/Avg sales); 
Formalisation of R&D activities dummy (1 if firm has R&D department or 
R&D plan or R&D result indicators); Cooperation dummy; Technology 
export dummy; Technology import dummy; Investment Capacity (Avg. 
investment/Avg.sales); Difficulties to finance R&D dummy 
Logit 
model 
Size (+); Industries: Mass 
production assemblers (+); 
Foreign ownership (-); 
Formalisation of R&D activities 
(+); Cooperation (+); Technology 
export (+); Investment capacity 
(+) 
Gonzalez et 
al.  
(2005) 
9455 observations (2214 
manufacturing firms); 1990-1999 
 
Survey on Business Strategies 
(Encuesta sobre Estrategias 
Empresariales/ ESEE) 
Spain Firm size; age; Degree of technological sophistication; Capital growth 
(measured by equipment foods and machinery); domestic exporter dummy; 
foreign ownership dummy; Market power dummy (1 if firm has significant 
market power); Industry dummies (not reported); Region dummies (not 
reported); Time dummies (not reported); Past subsidy 
Probit 
model 
Firm size (+); Age (+); 
Technological sophistication (+); 
Capital growth (+); Domestic 
exporter dummy (+); Foreign 
ownership (+); Past subsidy (+) 
Lööf and 
Heshmati  
(2005) 
770 firms, 1998-2000 
 
Community Innovation Survey 
data   
 
Sweden Firm size (no. employees); Gross investment/ no. employees; Capital 
stock/no. employees; Equity/ no. employees ; Debt/ no. employees ; 
Financial constraints dummy ; Skill constraints dummy; Export indicator; 
Foreign ownership; Group dummy (1 if firm is part of a group); Recurrent 
R&D dummy   
Probit 
model 
Debt/ no. employees (+); 
Financial constraints (+); Group 
(-); Recurrent R&D (+) 
Czarnitzki 
and Licht  
(2006) 
6,462 manufacturing and 
services firms, 1994-2000 
 
Mannheim Innovation Panel 
German Patent Office 
Germany Size (log no. of employees); Age (log no. years); R&D department dummy; 
Patent stock (log); No patents dummy (1 if firm never applied for a patent); 
Exports dummy (1 if firm exports products); Foreign ownership dummy; 
Group dummy Market structure (log of Herfindahl index of the firm’s 
industry); Credit rating index 
Probit 
model 
Size (+); Age (-); R&D 
department (+); Patent stock (+); 
No patents (-); Exports (+); 
Foreign ownership (-); Group (-); 
Market structure (+); Credit rating 
(+) 
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Table 1. Empirical studies on the determinants of firms’ participation in a R&D subsidy programme (continued) 
a
 Statistically significant at conventional levels 
 
 
 
 
 
Feldman and 
Kelley  
(2006) 
239 firm projects, 1998 
 
U.S. Advanced Technology 
Program at NIST 
Telephone Survey 
USA New R&D Partnership dummy (1 if project involved a new R&D 
partnership); New R&D direction dummy (1 if research topic is  new to 
firm); University linkages; Business linkages; Willingness to share research 
results dummy; First-time application dummy; Number of previous awards; 
Proposal effort (total dollars spent on the application); Industry dummies 
(omitted category: information technology and software); Quality rating of 
technical plan; Quality rating of business plan 
Logit 
model 
New R&D partnership (+); New 
R&D direction (+); Business 
linkages (+); Willingness to share 
research results (+); Industry: 
Biotech (+), Electronics (+); 
Quality rating of technical plan 
(+); Quality rating of business 
plan (+) 
Fier et al. 
(2006) 
 
 
659 firms, 2002-2004 
 
Mannheim Innovation Panel; 
German Federal Government's 
direct R&D funding database 
(PROFI); German Patent Office 
database (DPMA); Computer 
Aided Telephone Interview 
(CATI) data; German CIS data  
Germany 
 
  
 
 
Firm size (log of turnover); Age; Export Intensity; Occasional R&D 
activities dummy; Regular R&D activities dummy; Patent dummy; Eastern 
Germany dummy; Industry dummies (omitted category includes mining, 
electricity and construction sectors) 
 
 
Probit 
model 
 
 
Size (-); Age (-); Regular R&D 
activities (+); Eastern Germany 
(+);  Occasional R&D activities 
(+); Industries: Wood and paper 
products (-), Chemical and plastic 
(-) 
 
Kaiser  
(2006) 
 
 
 
  
 
442 manufacturing and services 
firms; 2001 
 
Survey data by the Danish 
Ministry of Economic and 
Business Affairs 
Denmark Firm size (no. of employees) Employees’ level of instruction; Local 
competition dummy; National competition dummy; Multinational 
competition dummy; Competition from public firms dummy; Cooperation 
dummy; Cooperation with academia dummy; Log no of patents; dummy for 
a new product introduced; Year dummies; Industry dummies  
Probit 
model 
Size (+); Patents (+); Local 
competition (+) 
Cooperation (+); Industries: Food 
(+), Other services (+) 
Aerts and 
Schmidt  
(2008) 
4566 observations (1471 firms); 
1998-2004 
 
Community Innovation Survey 
III and IV 
European Patent Office data 
Belgium 
(Flanders) 
and 
Germany 
Size (log no. employees); Patent stock; Group dummy (1 if firm belongs to a 
group); Foreign ownership dummy; Export quota; East Germany dummy 
(for German sample only) 
Probit 
model 
Size (+); Patent stock (+); Foreign 
ownership (-); Export quota (+); 
East Germany dummy (+) 
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Table 1. Empirical studies on the determinants of firms’ participation in a R&D subsidy programme (continued) 
a
 Statistically significant at conventional levels
Herrera and 
Nieto  
(2008) 
1517 manufacturing firms; 1998-
2000. 
 
Survey on Business Strategies 
(Encuesta sobre Estrategias 
Empresariales/ ESEE) 
Spain 
 
Firm Size (log of the number of employees); Firm age (average age during 
the period); Industry technology (high, medium or low-tech); Ownership of 
the firm (percentage of foreign capital participation; percentage of public 
capital participation); Dichotomised variable that indicates whether the 
government is a customer; Dichotomised variable that indicates if firm 
shows R&D planning and management activities; Dummy variable for 
difficulty in funding innovation activity; Export propensity; Dichotomised 
variable that indicates if firm is expanding market; Technological 
cooperation indicator; Technological imports/exports; Experience in R&D 
(R&D expenditures of the previous year; number of employees involved in 
R&D) 
Logit 
model 
Size (+); Foreign Ownership (-); 
Public Ownership (+); Export 
propensity (+); Expanding Market 
(+); R&D planning (+); 
Cooperation (+); Exports 
technology (+); Medium and Low 
tech Industry (-) 
 
Hussinger 
(2008) 
3744 manufacturing firms; 1992-
2000 
 
 Mannheim Innovation Panel 
Germany Size (log no. of employees); Age (log years); Log past subsidy intensity; 
Patent stock; Own R&D department dummy; Market share; Capital 
company; Export intensity; Foreign ownership dummy; East Germany 
dummy; Year dummies; Industry dummies (not reported) 
 
Probit 
model 
Past subsidy (+); Firm size (+); 
Patent stock (+); Own R&D 
department (+); Capital company 
(+); Export intensity (+); Foreign 
ownership (-); East Germany (+) 
Aschhoff 
(2010) 
6360 manufacturing and services 
firms; 1994-2004 
 
Mannheim Innovation Panel 
PROFI database 
Germany Continuation dummy (1 if firm gets subsidies from ongoing projects); 
Experience (no. of approved projects within the preceding 5 years); 
Experience EU dummy (1 if firm participated in European funding scheme); 
Experience regional (1 if firm participated in regional funding scheme); 
Sub_supply (amount of subsidies approved for starting projects in a certain 
industry); Size (log no. of employees); Change in no. of employees; Age; 
R&D_no dummy (1 if firm does not perform R&D); R&D_occ dummy (1 if 
firm performs R&D on an occasional basis); R&D_con dummy (1 if firm 
performs R&D on an continuous basis); Qualification (no. of employees 
with a university degree); Patent stock (deviation rate from the industry 
average); Domestic Group dummy (1 if the firm is part of domestic 
company group); Foreign ownership dummy; East Germany dummy  
Logit 
model 
Experience (+); Experience EU 
(+); Experience regional (+); 
Sub_supply (+); Size (+); 
R&D_occ (+); R&D_con (+); 
Qualification (+); Foreign 
Ownership (-) 
Dumont 
(2013) 
17,351 firms; 2001-2009 
 
Survey data from a Federal 
Public Service Finance database 
Belgium Size (no. of employees); R&D intensity; Research cooperation dummy; 
Young innovative company dummy; Value added; Industry dummies (not 
reported); Region dummies (not reported); Time dummies (not reported) 
Probit 
model 
Size (+); R&D intensity (+); 
Research cooperation (+); Young 
innovative company (+) 
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While we have found several studies that address the firms’ participation in 
R&D programmes, the same does not apply to the S&T organisations’ participation in 
R&D subsidy programmes. To the best of our knowledge, only Geuna (1998) has 
addressed the participation of universities on an R&D subsidy programme. 
The term “S&T organisations” is used here to identify both the government and 
higher education sectors.
5
 As has been stated before, S&T organisations play a main 
role in basic research, with more than three quarters of all OECD basic research being 
performed by units in the government and higher education sectors (OECD, 2013). 
A substantial part of S&T organisations’ R&D funding comes from 
governments directly, mainly through two types of financial support: institutional and 
project-based funding. The OECD defines institutional funding as “the general funding 
of institutions with no direct selection of R&D project or programmes” and project 
funding as “funding attributed on the basis of a project submission by a group or 
individuals for an R&D activity that is limited in scope, budget and time” (OECD, 
2013, p. 102). Because S&T organisations’ activities are mainly financed by 
governments, the allocation of research resources in these institutions has not received 
as much attention in the literature as public funding in firms. However, where project 
funding is concerned, especially when awarded through selective grant schemes where 
institutions compete against each other for limited funds, understanding the 
determinants of participation and awarding in these programmes is as relevant as it is in 
the firms’ case. As Jaffe (2002) points out, “while much of the literature has focused on 
support of commercial research, evaluating programmes that support basic research 
raises many of the same conceptual issues” (p.24). 
Competitive grant schemes for R&D funding in S&T organisations’ have been 
adopted by many European countries, such as Netherlands, Finland, Poland or Portugal. 
National policies aimed at higher selectivity in the allocation of public research funds 
are further reinforced by the European Union (EU). EU research actions, namely the 
Framework Programmes are characterised by a highly competitive approach, with large 
participation of the higher education institutions (Geuna, 2001). 
In what regards universities, Geuna (1998) conducted a study on university 
participation in EU-funded R&D cooperative projects. This paper examines the 
                                                        
5
 Considering the sectors’ scope defined in the Frascati Manual (OECD, 2002). 
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determinants of university participation in these projects, gathering data from 11 EU 
countries. The author tested both the probability of joining an EU-funded R&D 
cooperative project and the number of times a university participated in such projects. 
Results show that the scientific research productivity (measured by the ratio between 
the number of publications and the number of researchers) of the institution has a 
positive and significant effect both on the probability of taking part in an EU funded 
R&D cooperative project and the number of times the university participates in such 
projects. On the other hand, the size of the institution (proxied by the number of 
researchers) does not seem to influence an isolated decision to participate in a EU-
funded R&D cooperative project, but the author finds that size influences positively the 
number of participations through time. 
Our study on the determinants of firms and S&T organisations’ participation in 
R&D subsidy programmes will be focused on Portugal, a follower country for what 
concerns technological levels. Given that most existing studies on this subject focus on 
leader countries, it is essential to investigate the main differences that exist between 
Portugal and leader countries regarding the R&D and innovation system. Furthermore, 
it is relevant for our research to analyse the relative importance of firms and S&T 
organisations in R&D activities, which tends to follow specific patterns that are 
correlated to a country’s level of technological development. Hence, the following 
chapter provides a characterisation of the R&D and innovation system in Portugal, 
compared to other countries, namely those mentioned in previous studies on the 
determinants of firms’ participation in a R&D subsidy programme. Additionally, we 
include an overview of the R&D policy in Portugal in order to provide a background to 
the R&D subsidy programmes that will be analysed. 
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Chapter 3 – The Portuguese National Innovation System and R&D 
Policy  
 
3.1. The R&D and innovation system in Portugal 
The R&D and innovation system in Portugal presents, in general terms, features 
that are in line with the intermediate position of Portugal for what concerns its 
development level and its structural features. With a GDP per capita of 49 (USA=100) 
and a GERD
6
 equivalent of 1,5% of GDP, Portugal can be defined as a follower country 
for what concerns development and technological levels.
7
 
There are several recent analysis that deliver a thorough characterization of the 
R&D and innovation system in Portugal. One major reference is the study made by FCT 
(2013), where we can find a quite complete and up-to-date analysis of the S&T 
activities in Portugal and its evolution in recent years.
8
 Also, in the framework of the 
preparation or the evaluation of Portuguese public policies concerning or including 
innovation, we can quote two recent technical analysis in which we have participated: 
the middle term evaluation of the Operational Programme for Competitiveness Factors 
(COMPETE)
9
 and the ex-ante evaluation of the Partnership Agreement “Portugal 
2020”.10 Finally, we have at our disposal some annual reports that allow us to establish 
a benchmark for the Portuguese innovation system, as it is the case of the Innovation 
Union Scoreboard.
11
 
Since the early 80’s, the gross expenditure in R&D (GERD) has been growing in 
Portugal. In the last decade, the Portuguese GERD has increased from 0,77% of the 
GDP in 2001 to 1,64% in 2009, although since 2010 we have observed a break in this 
trend, with GERD levels dropping to 1,5% of the GDP in 2012. However, the level of 
expenditure in R&D in Portugal is yet below the European average, being equivalent to 
72% of the EU-27 average (figure 1). 
                                                        
6
 GERD – Gross Domestic Expenditure on Research and Development. 
7
 Statistical data refer to 2012. Source: Eurostat. 
8
 FCT is the acronymous of Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia, the Portuguese public agency that is 
in charge of funding the Science and Technology subsystem. 
9
 Augusto Mateus & Associados and PwC Portugal (2013), Estudo de Avaliação Intercalar do Programa 
Operacional Fatores de Competitividade (COMPETE) - Relatório Final. 
10
 ICETA (2013), Avaliação Ex Ante da Proposta de Acordo de Parceria para a Aplicação em Portugal 
dos Fundos do Quadro Estratégico Comum 2014-2020 – Relatório Final. 
11 See, for example, European Union (2014), Innovation Union Scoreboard 2014, UNU-MERIT. 
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Figure 1. Gross domestic expenditure on R&D in Portugal and selected EU countries, 
2001-2012
a
  
 
a
 Comparison countries include those cited in the literature on the determinants of participation in R&D 
subsidy programmes, when information is available.  
Source: Eurostat. 
 
Figure 2. Gross domestic expenditure on R&D by performing sector, Portugal, 2001-
2012 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
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The growth of Portuguese expenditure in R&D in the last decade has been 
mainly driven by an increase of business expenditure in R&D (BERD) and higher 
education expenditure on R&D (HERD), that represent 47% and 37% of GERD in 
2012, respectively.
12
 The weight of the private non-profit organisations sector has 
remained relatively stable, around 8-12% of total expenditures, while the R&D 
performed in the government sector has been slowly decreasing, being equivalent to 7% 
of GERD in 2012 (figure 2). However, the quota of R&D performed in the business 
sector in Portugal is yet below the common pattern for leader countries, where the ratio 
BERD/GERD is usually above 60% (table 2). 
 
Table 2. R&D expenditure by sectors of performance (% GERD), 2011. 
 
BERD HERD GOVERD
a 
Non Profit 
EU (28 countries) 63,23 23,52 12,25 0,98 
Finland 70,26 20,00 08,94 0,78 
Denmark 65,77 31,54 02,01 0,33 
Germany 67,82 17,99 14,53 - 
Austria 68,59 25,63 05,05 0,30 
France 64,00 20,88 13,77 1,33 
Belgium 68,77 22,17 08,14 0,09 
Portugal 46,71 37,50 07,23 7,89 
Spain 52,20 27,94 19,11 - 
a
 Government intramural expenditure on R&D, includes all public performed R&D that is not in the 
higher education sector. 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
The business sector, along with the government sector, is the major source of 
funds to R&D activities in Portugal (figure 3). In the last decade, we have observed an 
increasing trend in the relative weight of business-funded R&D expenditures, while 
government-funded R&D is decreasing in relative importance. However, while 
business-funded R&D is mostly carried out within the business sector (in 2010, only 5% 
represented funding to other sectors), government funds are highly directed at R&D 
activities performed at other sectors, namely in the higher education sector (FCT, 2013). 
The FCT report also refers that business-funded R&D represented only 0,6% of HERD 
in 2010, remarking that “the percentage direct funding from the business to the higher 
education sector, an indicator that can be used to assess the existing interaction between 
firms and higher education institutions (Dosi et al., 2006), allows us to conclude that, in 
                                                        
12
 BERD includes all R&D performed in the business sector, regardless of the origin of funding; HERD 
includes all R&D performed in the higher education sector, regardless of the origin of funding. 
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Portugal, such interaction is very reduced” (FCT, 2013, p. 94, own translation). 
However, we must note that cooperation between firms and higher education 
institutions may also be funded by the government sector through public policy 
instruments. The intermediate evaluation of the COMPETE Operational Programme 
reports, for the period 2007-2014, a higher importance of publicly funded cooperation 
projects, including firms and S&T organisations, especially under the SI I&DT, when 
compared with the former period 2000-2006 (Augusto Mateus & Associados and PwC 
Portugal, 2013).  
 
Figure 3. Gross domestic expenditure on R&D by source of funds, Portugal, 2001-2011. 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
Considering the data from the Innovation Union Scoreboard 2014 (IUS 2014), 
Portugal is ranked as a “moderate innovator”, i.e., belongs to the group of countries 
with an innovation performance below the European average, showing an Innovation 
Index of about 75% of the EU-27 average.
13
 However, regarding the evolution of the 
composite index over time, Portugal has been converging with the European average, 
                                                        
13
 The Innovation Index is a composite indicator that includes 25 different, equally-weighted indicators 
defined in the Innovation Union Scoreboard (European Union, 2014).  
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showing an average annual growth rate much higher than the EU-27 in the last five 
years (3,86%). 
In a more detailed analysis of the indicators that are included in the IUS 2014, 
we observe that Portugal tends to perform better at upstream innovation activities, 
namely in the indicators that capture the scientific and technologic effort in higher 
education and scientific research systems (defined in the IUS as “enablers”), while a 
stronger deficit remains at the firm activities level, and, mostly, in what concerns the 
outputs and economic effects of innovation (table 3). 
 
Table 3. Portuguese standing in the IUS 2014 in selected indicators  
 
Current Performance 
Avg. Annual 
Growth Rate
a
 
 
  
Portugal 
Leader 
Country 
EU-27 Portugal EU-27  
Innovation Index 2013 0,410 
0,750  
(Sweden) 
0,554 3,86% 1,66% 
Enablers      
New doctorate graduates (ISCED 6) per 1000 
population aged 25-34 (2011) 
1,6 
3,1 
(Switzerland) 
1,7 -5,6% 2,8% 
Percentage population aged 30-34 having 
completed tertiary education (2012) 
27,2 
51,1 
(Ireland) 
35,8 6,3% 3,6% 
International scientific co-publications per 
million population (2012) 
761 
1862 
(Iceland and 
Switzerland) 
343 12,3% 6% 
Scientific publications among the top 10% most 
cited publications worldwide as % of total 
scientific publications of the country (2009) 
9,9 
15,9 
(Switzerland) 
11,0 4,3% 1,4% 
R&D expenditure in the public sector as % of 
GDP (2012) 
0,68 
1,09 
(Finland) 
0,75 8,3% 1,8% 
Venture capital investment as % of GDP (2012) 0,213 
0,538 
(Luxembourg) 
0,277 -3,7% -2,8% 
Firm Activities      
R&D expenditure in the business sector as % of 
GDP (2012) 
0,70 
2,33 
(Finland) 
1,31 12,9% 2% 
Innovative SMEs collaborating with others as % 
of SMEs (2010) 
8,1 
22,3  
(UK) 
11,7 1,3% 3,8% 
PCT patents applications per billion GDP in 
PPS€ (2010) 
0,79 
2,81 
(Switzerland) 
1,98 5,9% 0% 
Outputs      
SMEs introducing product or process 
innovations as % of SMEs (2010) 
45,6 
57,0 
(Germany) 
38,4 2,4% 1,3% 
Employment in knowledge-intensive activities 
(manufacturing and services) as % of total 
employment (2012) 
9,0 
20,5 
(Luxembourg) 
13,9 0,3% 0,75% 
Knowledge-intensive services exports as % total 
service exports (2011) 
30,1 
67,4 
(Ireland and 
Luxembourg) 
45,3 5,2% 1% 
a
 Considering the last five years for which information is available. 
Source: European Union (2014). 
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In line with this diagnosis, the already mentioned FCT report states that “(…) 
the Portuguese scientific production has registered remarkable growth rates, in a 
convergence process with the European average. Between 1996 and 2010, the 
Portuguese contribute to the published knowledge in the world has almost tripled (2,7 
times), showing an average annual growth rate of 14% in the last decade (although we 
observe a slight slowdown of this trend between 2005 and 2010, with an average annual 
growth rate of 13%)” (FCT, 2013, p.135, own translation). The same study also refers 
that seven Portuguese universities stand out in terms of publications volume between 
2006 and 2010, each having (co-) authored at least 5.000 publications, namely, in 
decreasing order of quantity: Universidade do Porto, Universidade Técnica de Lisboa, 
Universidade de Lisboa, Universidade de Coimbra, Universidade de Aveiro, 
Universidade Nova de Lisboa e Universidade do Minho (FCT, 2013). 
However, several challenges remain at the firm innovation efforts level and the 
translation of the global scientific and technological effort into better economic results. 
For instance, Portugal shows a below average performance in the patent indicator, 
denoting a deficit in the economic valorisation of knowledge creation. The number of 
PCT patent applications in Portugal amounted to 0,79 per billion GDP in 2010, which 
corresponds to about 40% of the EU average, and only 28% of the PCT patent 
applications in Switzerland, the leading country in this indicator, although the high 
average growth rate reported in the IUS (5,9%) indicates signs of catching up in 
patenting activity. 
Overall, we conclude that the Portuguese R&D and innovation system has 
progressively developed over the last decade. Most notable advances were observed in 
the scientific and technologic public system, especially in the higher education research 
network, that have translated into growing indicators of international scientific 
publications and further integration of Portuguese organisations in international 
knowledge networks. The involvement of the business sector in R&D has also grown 
substantially, although the structural underinvestment in R&D still remains a challenge 
both in the business sector and at the global spending level. Hence, while following a 
convergence path with the EU, Portugal still presents features of a follower country 
regarding technological levels, which must be taken into consideration while 
proceeding with our analysis. 
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3.2. The R&D policy framework in Portugal 
The first governmental efforts in developing a national science and technology 
policy in Portugal have started in the 1980s. In this period, innovation and R&D policy 
was mainly oriented for the creation of basic S&T infrastructures and support of R&D 
in public or semi-public institutions such as universities, research centres, technological 
centres and public laboratories, as well as other non-profit organisations, largely 
following a technology-push rationale (Laranja, 2009). The 1990s decade saw the 
growth and consolidation of this policy approach, operationalised through the 
CIENCIA, PEDIP I and PEDIP II programmes.  
In the last fifteen years, public policies for business R&D and innovation have 
been developed, mainly in the context of operational programmes co-financed by the 
European Union. During the QCA III
14
 period (2000-2006), the first substantial policy 
measures towards the support of business R&D and innovation were introduced, being 
greatly improved in the subsequent QREN
15
 period (Schuman Associates, 2011). 
The QREN was the latest set of structural programmes implemented in Portugal, 
running from 2007 to 2013, and was financed by European Union cohesion policy funds 
in 21,5 billion euros, aiming at promoting “the qualification of the Portuguese people 
through an emphasis on knowledge, science, technology and innovation, as well as the 
promotion of high and sustained levels of economic and socio-cultural development and 
territorial qualification within a framework of expanding equal opportunities and 
increasing the efficiency and quality of public institutions.” (Observatório do QCA III, 
2007, p.5). Several public funding instruments to support R&D and innovation were 
included in QREN, operationalised through the Operational Programme for 
Competitiveness Factors (COMPETE) and Regional Operational Programmes, such as: 
a support system for S&T organisations’ R&D projects (SAESCTN); a support system 
for infrastructural and equipment investments in S&T organisations (SAICT); a support 
system for infrastructural and equipment investments in science and technology parks 
and business incubators (SAPCTIEBT); a support system for business R&D (SI I&DT); 
a support system for business investment productive innovation (SI Inovação); and a 
                                                        
14
 Quadro Comunitário de Apoio III is the reference document for the programming of European Union 
Funds in Portugal for the 2000–2016 period (i.e., the Portuguese CSF III). 
15
 Quadro de Referência Estratégico Nacional is the reference document for the programming of 
European Union Funds in Portugal for the 2007–2013 period (i.e., the Portuguese NSRF). 
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support system for SME investment in competitiveness reinforcement, namely in 
internationalization (SI QPME). 
Regarding public support to R&D specifically, the Science and Technology 
subsystem is mainly financed through direct funding managed by the Fundação para a 
Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT), a public agency for science, technology and innovation 
funding, in all scientific domains. For this purpose, FCT mobilizes both funds coming 
from QREN instruments (mainly SAESCTN) and from the State Budget. Support to 
business R&D is materialized in tax credits and direct funding, in which the QREN 
instruments have been of great relevance. Figure 4 shows the evolution of the public 
funding of business R&D in Portugal, both for tax credits (first introduced in 1997 with 
the SIFIDE instrument) and direct funding.  
 
Figure 4. Public funding of business R&D by type of funding, Portugal, 1997-2010
a
 
a
2004 omitted due to missing data. 
Source: Carvalho (2013). 
 
The data show that the effort of Portuguese public authorities in the support of 
business R&D has been increasing, especially between 2005 and 2009, decreasing only 
in 2010, due to a decrease in tax credits. The evolution of direct public funding of 
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business R&D reveals a remarkable increase in 2007, after the implementation of 
QREN. 
In the QREN framework, two support systems were specifically oriented 
towards the support of R&D: the Incentive System for Research and Technology 
Development in firms (SI I&DT) and the Science and Technology Organisations 
Support System (SAESCTN). 
The SAESCTN is a support system that comes in the wake of technology-push 
based programmes implemented since the late 1980s, aimed at improving and 
strengthening the Science & Technology system in Portugal, particularly public and 
higher education-based R&D organisations as well as other non-profit research 
organisations, making it more competitive and encouraging the linkages between S&T 
organisations and firms. Support actions under this instrument include the financial 
support to scientific research and technological development projects concerning basic 
research, applied research and/or experimental development, that involve one or several 
S&T organisations, and also includes the support to projects aimed at promoting the 
scientific and technological culture.  
The SI I&DT is an R&D subsidy programme oriented for the business sector, 
aiming to increase firms’ competitiveness by stimulating private technology R&D 
efforts and fostering articulation between firms and organisations in the national 
Science & Technology system. 
Since both these instruments translate into R&D subsidies directed to firms (in 
the SI I&DT case) and S&T organisations (in the SAESCTN case) we have selected 
them in order to study the determinants of participation in R&D subsidy programmes. 
The following chapter provides a further characterization of both support systems. 
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Chapter 4 – Data Set and Descriptive Statistics 
 
4.1. The Selected R&D Policy Instruments and Data Set Description 
The aim of this dissertation is to analyse the determinants of subsidy awarding 
to firms and S&T organisations in competitive R&D subsidy schemes. In order to do 
this, the two previously mentioned R&D policy instruments will be analysed for the 
Portuguese case: the SI I&DT and the SAESCTN.  
Both the selected research funding instruments are competitive funding schemes 
where subsidies are awarded for specific R&D projects, the main difference being the 
recipient of the subsidy – under the SI I&DT, funding is awarded to firms while, under 
the SAESCTN, subsidies are awarded to S&T organisations.
16
 Nevertheless, both 
instruments allow for cooperation projects so that, as long as the main promoter (i.e., 
the entity that leads the project) is under the scope defined for the instrument, co-
promoters can be private or public organisations.  
Our empirical approach relies on data from databases that come from the 
information system of COMPETE, the managing authority that runs the Operational 
Programme for Competitiveness Factors in Portugal. These include information on 
project applications and subsidised projects to SI I&DT and SAESCTN for the period 
2007-2012.
17
 One should note, though, that the scope of these databases does not 
include all projects under SI I&DT and SAESCTN because they only concern projects 
integrated in the Operational Programme for Competitiveness Factors (COMPETE), 
while other projects under the same instruments were integrated in Regional 
Operational Programmes. The scope of the COMPETE (and therefore, our data) is: 
SAESCTN projects in Norte, Centro and Alentejo; and SI I&DT projects in Norte, 
Centro and Alentejo, for large and medium firms. It may also include micro and small 
firms in cooperation projects in which the leader is a large or medium firm, or in 
cooperation projects where co-promoters are located outside Norte, Centro or Alentejo. 
Moreover, while the data timeframe covers most of the QREN funding period, the 
                                                        
16
 Both instruments also allow funding to projects from non-profit organisations. 
17
 Each observation corresponds to a different project application. Note though that promoters may apply 
for subsidy with more than one project, as will be detailed in the descriptive statistics. 
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available data do not comprise the entire length of the instruments, since further 
applications were permitted after 2012. 
In the following sections we provide a detailed description of available data 
under each instrument, as well as some descriptive statistics. 
 
4.2. Firm-oriented R&D Policy Instrument (SI I&DT): Descriptive 
Statistics 
Regarding the firm-oriented policy instrument (SI I&DT), our database includes 
information on 1.404 project applications. Of these, we have excluded from the analysis 
184 observations where no decision on subsidy award was reached. We have also opted 
to exclude projects which were ineligible for subsidy under the instrument’s regulations, 
namely 19 projects from ineligible industries.  
 Therefore, our sample includes 1.201 project applications to the SI I&DT 
instrument between 2007 and 2012, of which 725 were approved (60,37%). Some of the 
approved projects were not carried out by the promoter and have not received the 
subsidy (114 abandoned projects). Overall, the subsidies given on this period amount to 
399,4 million euros, the implicit subsidy rate being 46, 23% (table 4). 
 
Table 4. SI I&DT applications and approved projects overview 
  No. 
Investment 
(applied) (€) 
Avg. Invest. 
(€) 
Subsidy (€) 
Avg. 
Subsidy 
(€) 
Avg. Subs. 
Rate  (%) 
Project 
Applications 
1.201 1.411.965.773,39 1.175.658,43 
   
Approved Projects 725 924.202.007,50 1.274.761,39 
   
Approved Projects 
(non-abandoned) 
611 734.096.161,69 1.201.466,71 339.362.210,07 555.420,97 46,23 
 
The SI I&DT regulations establish eight types of projects that may be submitted 
to receive a subsidy, and every application must fit one of these categories. The types of 
project include: Individual Projects, R&D projects undertaken by one promoter; 
Cooperation Projects, R&D projects undertaken in a partnership between co-promoters, 
that may be firms or other institutions, such as S&T organisations; Mobilising Projects, 
which are projects jointly promoted by several organisations mobilising scientific and 
technological capacities with high technological and innovative content and 
considerable impacts at multi-sectoral or regional level or on clusters; R&D Vouchers, 
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in which low-budget subsidies are given to SMEs in order to foster the acquisition of 
technological R&D services from qualified S&T organisations; Special Regime 
Projects, projects with special interest to the economy that must comprise an investment 
of at least 15 million euros; Collective R&D projects undertaken by business 
associations aimed at tackling problems and R&D needs shared by a large number of 
firms in a certain sector, cluster or region; R&D Unit implementation, that comprises 
projects undertaken by SMEs to set up in-house permanent R&D units; and R&D 
centres, set up by companies that already undertake ongoing, structured R&D activities, 
in order to increase their R&D efforts beyond their normal everyday lines of research. 
In what concerns these typologies, most applications were received for 
individual or cooperation projects, namely: 429 applications for individual R&D 
projects (36% of total applications), and 587 applications for cooperation projects 
(49%). On average, cooperation projects involve a slightly higher investment, which is 
expected as the inherent risk of R&D is shared by a larger number of promoters.  
Special Regime projects show a higher average investment, since a minimum of 15 
million euros investment is required a priori (yet the investment for these projects 
largely surpasses this value, averaging 26 million per project). As mentioned before, 
R&D vouchers are low-budget subsidies that can only be used to acquire R&D services 
from S&T organisations. For this reason, this category shows a much lower average 
investment than other types of project (table 5). 
 
Table 5. SI I&DT applications by type of project 
Type of Project No. of Applications Investment (applied) (€) Avg. Investment (€) 
Individual Projects 429 457.150.118,20 1.065.617,99 
Cooperation Projects 587 649.107.150,53 1.105.804,35 
Mobilising Projects 16 139.447.861,00 8.715.491,31 
R&D Vouchers 114 3.448.941,87 30.253,88 
Special Regime Projects 5 130.146.447,41 26.029.289,48 
Collective R&D 7 5.838.552,83 834.078,98 
R&D Unit 39 20.748.556,45 532.014,27 
R&D Centre 4 6.078.145,10 1.519.536,28 
Total  1.201 1.411.965.773,39 1.175.658,43 
 
Most projects applications were made by firms (1.187 projects), however there 
were also 7 projects led by business associations and 7 projects led by non-profit 
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organisations.
18
 However, since promoters may submit more than one project, these 
figures do not reflect the actual number of firms that applied to the subsidy programme. 
Considering only distinct promoters (i.e., any promoter that applied at least once), in the 
period 2007-2012, a total of 677 promoters submitted project applications to the SI 
I&DT. The number of project applications by promoter ranges from 1 to 24, with an 
average of 1,77 applications by promoter. Figure 5 details the distribution of the number 
of project applications by distinct promoters. 
 
Figure 5. SI I&DT project applications by distinct promoters 
 
 
Regarding the size, promoters have been classified into four groups: Micro 
Firms are those with less than 10 employees, Small Firms have between 10 and 49 
employees, Medium Firms have between 50 and 249 employees and Large Firms are 
those with 250 or more employees. 
Most project applications were made by medium and large firms (45% and 39% 
of the total applications, respectively), with the average investment by project being 
                                                        
18
 Promoter statistics refer only to main promoters (i.e., the organisation that leads the project), unless 
stated otherwise. Note that some projects, namely cooperation projects, involve the main promoter and 
other co-promoters, however we do not have information on co-promoters for all project applications.  
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substantially higher among large firms. Micro and small firms were only eligible 
promoters in cooperation projects involving co-promoters from other regions. This 
explains the small expression of micro and small firms as main promoters in R&D 
projects applied to the COMPETE. Nevertheless there are applications for 74 projects 
led by micro firms, representing 13% of cooperation project applications and 6% of 
total applications; and 108 projects led by small firms, representing 18% of cooperation 
projects and 9% of total applications. Projects led by micro and small firms show a 
higher average investment than those led by medium firms, probably because of the 
effect of cooperation. 
Analysing the number of project applications by distinct promoters, these 
records seem to show that firm size plays an important role in the number of project 
applications by the same promoter. On average, large firms have applied more than 
twice to the subsidy programme, while smaller firms apply fewer projects (table 6). 
 
Table 6. SI I&DT project applications by promoter size
a 
Size 
No. of Project 
Applications 
Avg. 
Investment 
(applied) (€) 
No. of 
Distinct 
Promoters
b 
Avg. 
Applications 
by Distinct 
Promoters 
Micro Firms 74 1.329.863,95 61 1,21 
Small Firms 108 1.109.863,44 73 1,48 
Medium Firms 544 684.017,16 337 1,61 
Large Firms 468 1.743.048,51 220 2,13 
Total 1.194 1.177.660,99 691 1,73 
a 
Projects led by Business Associations are not considered since size discrimination does not apply. 
b 
There are 20 cases of firms that changed size categories between project applications, for which 
duplication could not be avoided. 
 
Regarding the age of the promoters, we have considered, for each project 
application, the age of the promoter in years at the time of the application. The average 
age is 22,6 years, ranging from 1 to 167 years. In what concerns foreign ownership, 
14,6% of the project applications were made by firms participated by foreign capital 
(table 7). 
 
Table 7. Age and foreign capital (descriptive statistics) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
By Project Application (N=1201) 
Age  22,644 20,958 1 167 
Foreign Capital  0,1457119 0,3529641 0 1 
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There are several differences among industries regarding project applications to 
the subsidy programme (table 8). The selected industry categories take into 
consideration the Portuguese Classification of Economic Activities (CAE Rev.3), as 
defined in table A.1 of the Appendix.
19
 
 
Table 8. SI I&DT project applications by industry  
Industry 
No. of 
project 
applica-
tions 
Avg 
Investment 
by project (€) 
No. of 
distinct 
promo-
ters
a 
Industry’s total 
no. of firms  
(% of firms 
with at least 1 
application )
b 
Avg. 
applica-
tions by 
distinct 
promoter 
Agriculture, Forest and Fisheries 10 974.052,10 8 56.648 (0,01%)  1,25 
Mining 6 3.477.756,50 4 1.489 (0,27%) 1,50 
Food and Beverages 55 692.289,90 39 11.430 (0,34%) 1,41 
Textiles and Clothing 93 667.745,38 70 18.795 (0,37%) 1,33 
Wood, Paper and Furniture 75 714.589,99 36 14.865 (0,24%) 2,08 
Petroleum, Chemicals and Plastics 95 748.691,36 61 2.133 (2,86%) 1,56 
Pharmaceuticals 11 16.157.824,42 3 154 (1,95%) 3,67 
Non-metalic materials 57 839.753,79 38 5.262 (0,72%) 1,50 
Metals 113 1.257.339,26 71 15.757 (0,45%) 1,59 
Machinery, Electrical Equipment 
and Transports 
172 1.282.837,11 101 32.694 (0,31%) 1,70 
Electronics and Computers 204 1.023.523,70 108 10.239 (1,05%) 1,89 
Energy and Waste Management 26 607.460,32 21 1.718 (1,22%) 1,24 
Construction and Engineering 106 964.104,67 64 162.141 (0,04%) 1,66 
Services 66 1.848.084,16 50 280.199 (0,02%) 1,32 
Scientific Research and 
Development 
81 1.157.204,20 57 2.126 (2,68%) 1,42 
Other 31 827.037,85 27 - 1,15 
Total 1.201 1.175.658,43 758 - 1,58 
a
There are 81 cases of firms with more than one CAE or that changed CAE between projects, for which 
duplication could not be avoided. 
b
Source: INE, Sistema de Contas Integradas das Empresas (SCIE), Portugal, data refer to 2008. 
 
Manufacturing industries represent almost 73% of all projects applied to the SI 
I&DT, with most project applications being made by firms in the Electronic and 
Computers and Machinery, Electrical Equipment and Transports sectors (17% and 14% 
of the total project applications respectively).
20
 These sectors also show the highest 
number of different firms that applied for a subsidy at least once. On the opposite, only 
                                                        
19
 The Portuguese Classification of Economic Activities (CAE Rev.3) is designed by the Portuguese 
National Statistics Institute (INE) and corresponds largely to the NACE Rev.2. 
20
 Manufacturing industries include: Food and Beverages; Textiles and Clothing; Wood, Paper and 
Furniture; Petroleum, Chemicals and Plastics; Pharmaceuticals; Non-metallic materials; Metals; 
Machinery; Electrical Equipment and Transports; and Electronics and Computers. 
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16 projects refer to firms in the primary sector (Agriculture, Forest and Fisheries and 
Mining).   
We have compared the number of firms that applied at least once to the R&D 
subsidy programme with the industry’s total number of firms, in order to have a general 
idea of which sectors have more firms applying to the programme relative to their size.  
Considering, as reference, the total number of firms in each industry in Portugal (data 
from 2008), our calculations show that the Petroleum, Chemicals and Plastics, 
Scientific Research and Development and Pharmaceuticals sectors are those where 
adhesion to the subsidy programme was higher. 
 Concerning the number of applications by promoter, the Pharmaceutical sector 
shows the highest figure, with promoters having applied, on average, more than three 
times. The Wood, Paper and Furniture and the Electronic and Computers sectors also 
show a high number of average applications by promoter (2,08 and 1,89, respectively). 
On average, firms in the Pharmaceutical sector have submitted projects that 
entail a much higher investment than other industries (these projects show an average 
investment of 16 million euros, compared to the 1,2 million euros average investment 
for all the industries together). Despite the low number of projects, the Mining industry 
also shows a high average investment by project (3,5 million euros). 
Our database also offers information about the regional focus of the project, 
according to the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistic 2 (NUTS 2) 
classification. The regional focus does not relate to the firms’ headquarters, rather 
concerning the region in which the project will take place. Therefore, projects have been 
classified as Norte, Centro or Alentejo if the project takes place solely in each region, or 
Multi-Region, if it has a broader scope.
21
 
The Norte region is the focus of most project applications (37%), followed by 
multi-regional projects (35%). This relevance of multi-regional projects is in line with 
the above mentioned relevance of cooperation projects, since the multi-regional nature 
derives, in general, from the presence of partners located in different regions. The 
average investment is also higher for projects in these regions, and progressively lower 
in Centro and Alentejo (table 9). 
                                                        
21
 In multi-regional projects, the scope is not limited to the three above regions, but to all Portuguese 
territory, as long as at least one of the convergence regions (i.e., Norte, Centro, or Alentejo) is included as 
well. 
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Table 9. SI I&DT project applications by regional focus 
Region 
No. of project 
applications 
Investment 
(applied) (€) 
Avg. 
Investment (€) 
Norte 447 554.348.866,89 1.240.154,06 
Centro 290 271.048.686,26 934.650,64 
Alentejo 48 30.818.044,72 642.042,60 
Multi-Regional 416 555.750.175,52 1.335.937,92 
Total  1.201 1.411.965.773,39 1.175.658,43 
 
 
4.3. R&D Policy Instrument for S&T Organisations: Descriptive Statistics 
For the R&D policy instrument designed for S&T institutions (SAESCTN), our 
database includes information on 11.077 project applications. Of these, we have 
excluded from our analysis 2.665 observations where no decision on subsidy award was 
reached. We have also excluded projects which were ineligible for subsidy under the 
instrument’s regulations, namely 5 projects outside the regional scope of the instrument. 
Hence, our sample includes 8.407 project applications to the SAESCTN between 2008 
and 2012, of which 2.203 were approved (26,2% approval rate). Of the approved 
projects, 61 were cancelled out later on and have not received the subsidy. Overall, 
2.142 projects received a subsidy. Applied projects require, on average, an investment 
of 172 thousand Euros, a figure that is much lower than the average investment of firm 
projects under the SI I&DT (1,2 million euros). On the other hand, the implicit subsidy 
rate averages 70,42% for projects under the SAESCTN, compared to 46% for firm 
projects under the SI I&DT (table 10).  
    
Table 10. SAESCTN applications and approved projects overview 
  No. 
Investment 
(applied) (€) 
Avg. 
Invest. (€) 
Subsidy (€) 
Avg. 
Subsidy (€) 
Avg. 
Subsidy 
Rate (%) 
Project Applications 8.407 1.266.433.312,97 150.640,34       
Approved Projects 2.203 372.928.067,06 169.281,92       
Approved Projects 
2.142 367.619.339,06 171.624,34 258.875.781,73 120.857,04 70,42 
(non-abandoned) 
 
The SAESCTN regulations establish 5 possible types of project applications: 
Individual projects, undertaken by one S&T organisation; Cooperation projects, 
undertaken in a partnership between S&T organisations or between these and firms; 
S&T Culture projects, which are across-the-board projects to promote scientific and 
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technological culture, especially in Ciência Viva centres network; and Individual or 
Cooperation Strategic R&D projects, which include applications made to a specific 
call-for-proposals restricted to projects from Associated Labs or R&D Units with “Very 
Good” or higher classification by the FCT. Most applications were made for individual 
(57,7%) and cooperation (40,6%) R&D projects led by S&T institutions. As expected, 
the average investment is slightly higher in cooperation projects than individual 
projects. Due to their nature, strategic R&D Projects show a much higher average 
investment than other types of project (table 11). 
 
Table 11. SAESCTN applications by type of project 
Type of Project 
No. of 
project 
applications 
Investment 
(applied) (€) 
Avg. 
Investment 
(€) 
Individual Projects 4.848 626.010.256,00 129.127,53 
Cooperation Projects 3.417 543.111.402,00 158.943,93 
S&T Culture Projects 71 23.848.173,97 335.889,77 
Strategic R&D Projects (individual) 62 44.659.408,00 720.313,03 
Strategic R&D Projects (cooperation) 9 28.804.073,00 3.200.452,56 
Total  8.407 1.266.433.312,97 150.640,34 
 
The S&T organisations that may apply to the SAESCTN instrument are higher 
education organisations, government research agencies or non-profit research 
organisations. Higher education organisations can be public universities, associate 
laboratories, polytechnic institutes or other higher education institutions. In the context 
of our analysis, Public University includes all public universities as well as university-
based R&D centres, with the exception of those rated as an associate laboratory. The 
associate laboratories (Assoc. Lab) are scientific research units, either public or non-
profit private units, which are selected to collaborate in pursuing specific objectives 
within the government’s science and technology policy. The title of Associate 
Laboratory is granted for periods of 10 years, and currently there are 26 R&D units with 
this title, most of which are formed by R&D centres from public universities. The 
Polytechnic category includes all higher education organisations that belong to 
Polytechnical Institutes. The main difference between the polytechnical and university 
higher education systems in Portugal is that the former is aimed at providing a more 
practical and profession-oriented training, while the latter is aimed at providing more 
theoretical training and is highly research-oriented. Other higher education agencies 
(Other HE) include mostly private universities. The government agencies who applied 
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for R&D subsidies are, for the most part, public laboratories (Pub. Lab) or public 
hospitals (Pub. Hospital).  
The higher education sector, as a whole, is responsible for 94% of all project 
applications to the SAESCTN programme. Especially relevant are the public 
universities, who represent 73% of all project applications, and, at a much lower level, 
the associate laboratories (14%). Note that the later are mainly formed by R&D centres 
from public universities, although, for instance, an R&D centre from a polytechnic 
institute can be part of an associate laboratory. The government sector is responsible for 
only 1,7% of project applications and non-profit organisations account for the 
remaining 4,3%. However, projects submitted by governmental and non-profit 
organisations involve, on average, a higher investment than projects submitted by 
higher education institutions, with the exception of associate laboratories, whose 
projects have the highest average investment (table 12). 
 
Table 12. SAESCTN applications by type of promoter 
Type of Promoter 
No. of project 
applications 
Investment 
(applied) (€) 
Avg. 
Investment 
(€) 
Higher 
Education 
Public University 6.135 889.306.512,12 144.956,24 
Assoc. Lab 1.181 212.532.637,63 179.959,90 
Polytechnic  493 65.881.311,98 133.633,49 
Other HE 90 12.737.447,89 141.527,20 
Government 
Pub. Lab 96 16.719.948,00 174.166,13 
Pub. Hospital 48 8.571.530,00 178.573,54 
Other Gov 3 496.574,00 165.524,67 
Non-Profit Organisations 361 60.187.351,35 166.723,96 
Total  8.407 1.266.433.312,97 150.640,34 
 
The SAESCTN programme has received project applications in a broad range of 
scientific areas (table 13).
22
 The most representative area, both in terms of number of 
project applications and total investment, is the Medical and Health Sciences (18% of 
project applications concern this scientific field, representing 19% of total applied 
investment). There were also a high number of project applications in Exact Sciences 
and Engineering domains, namely in Chemistry and Chemical Engineering (663 project 
applications), Electrical and Computer Engineering (619), Materials Science and 
Engineering (415), and Mechanical Engineering (411). Some of the Natural Sciences, 
                                                        
22
 We have considered 27 scientific areas, based on the FCT classification of Scientific Domains and 
Areas. 
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such as Biological Sciences and Environmental Sciences are also relevant (554 and 550 
project applications, respectively). In general, areas in the Social Sciences domain have 
less project applications, and such projects also have a lower dimension, measured in 
terms of the average project investment. This is not surprising since research in most 
social science fields is essentially intensive in human resources, and not likely to require 
much additional investment in material resources, such as laboratory equipment, 
therefore being less financially demanding than research in other scientific areas. 
 
Table 13. SAESCTN applications by scientific area 
Scientific Areas 
No. of 
project 
applications 
Investment 
(applied) (€) 
Avg. 
Investment (€) 
Life and Health Sciences    
Medical and Health Sciences 1.484 246.366.832,00 166.015,39 
Sports Sciences 121 14.309.804,00 118.262,84 
Exact Sciences and Engineering    
Chemistry and Chemical Engineering 663 103.813.701,00 156.581,75 
Electrical and Computer Engineering 619 84.606.295,00 136.682,22 
Materials Science and Engineering 415 69.990.970,00 168.652,94 
Mechanical Engineering 411 53.811.198,00 130.927,49 
Civil and Mining Engineering 297 46.053.785,00 155.063,25 
Physics 291 46.679.268,00 160.409,86 
Biotechnology 205 33.228.343,00 162.089,48 
Mathematics 134 12.559.611,00 93.728,44 
Energy and Transports 112 16.446.411,00 146.842,96 
Comunication and Information Sciences 92 8.380.042,00 91.087,41 
Natural and Environmental Sciences    
Biological Sciences 554 83.666.734,00 151.022,99 
Environmental Sciences 550 89.814.814,00 163.299,66 
Agricultural and Forestry Sciences 439 67.765.583,00 154.363,51 
Marine Science and Technology 291 56.418.912,00 193.879,42 
Animal and Veterinarian Science 158 25.120.860,00 158.992,78 
Geosciences 118 17.608.625,00 149.225,64 
Social Sciences and Humanities    
Business and Economics 258 23.121.729,00 89.619,10 
Education and Science Policy 246 28.149.102,00 114.427,24 
Psychology 211 26.206.537,00 124.201,60 
History 127 19.655.548,00 154.768,09 
Arts 69 9.565.347,00 138.628,22 
Law and Political Sciences 61 6.953.332,00 113.989,05 
Architecture 47 7.068.832,00 150.400,68 
Other Social Sciences 331 41.498.955,00 125.374,49 
Other 103 27.572.142,97 267.690,71 
Total  8.407 1.266.433.312,97 150.640,34 
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Similarly to the SI I&DT data, the projects’ regional scope has been classified as 
Norte, Centro or Alentejo if the project takes place solely in each region, or Multi-
Region, if it has a broader scope.
23
 Once again, the Norte region is the focus of most 
project applications (44%), followed by the Centro region (30%). Multi-regional 
projects account for 23% of project applications, requiring a higher average investment 
than projects focused in one region (table 14). 
 
Table 14. SAESCTN applications by regional focus  
Regional  
Focus 
No. of project 
applications 
Investment 
(applied) (€) 
Avg. 
Investment (€) 
Norte 3.688 535.555.242,56 145.215,63 
Centro 2.501 374.830.419,68 149.872,22 
Alentejo 266 36.146.739,91 135.890,00 
Multi-regional 1.952 319.900.910,82 163.883,66 
Total  8.407 1.266.433.312,97 150.640,34 
 
  
                                                        
23
 Norte, Centro and Alentejo correspond to the NUTS 2 classification. 
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Chapter 5 – Participation in R&D Subsidy Programmes: Methodology 
and Estimation Results 
 
5.1. Model Specification 
In order to analyse the determinants of subsidy attribution in the context of an 
R&D funding programme, we consider the case in which a public agency offers 
subsidies for specific R&D projects. Promoters that apply for a subsidy must provide 
information on their research project, and the public agency decides whether the project 
is approved (i.e., receives a subsidy) or not. 
We assume that the approval of a project application to a R&D subsidy 
programme depends on the net value to the public agency of funding a particular project 
 ,   
 . The i th project’s net value can be expressed as: 
  
                (5.1) 
where   is a vector of explanatory variables, β is a vector of unknown 
coefficients, and ε is the error term which is assumed to follow a normal distribution, 
with zero mean and unit variance. 
Because the net value of the applied projects to the public agency is not directly 
observed,   
  is an unobserved variable. However, if we know whether a project 
application is approved or not, we can define a binary variable,   , that takes on a value 
of one if the project application was approved and zero otherwise. This observed 
variable can be defined as: 
   {
       
                       
       
                    
  (5.2) 
Therefore, we have a binary discrete choice model that may be estimated using a 
probit model. In this approach, the estimated probability of project approval is given by: 
                            |                                               (5.3) 
where  is the standard normal distribution function. 
 The independent variables will be described for each type of programme – firm-
oriented (SI I&DT) and S&T organisation-oriented (SAESCTN) – in the following 
sections. 
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5.2. Firm Participation in R&D Subsidy Programmes  
5.2.1. Variables Description 
Taking into account the review of empirical literature carried out in section 2.4., 
and given the available data, the empirical model defined in equation 5.1 includes 
variables associated with firm characteristics, such as size, age and industry; and 
variables associated with project characteristics, such as the project typology and total 
investment.  
Firms have been classified into the four size groups defined before: Micro firms 
(<10 employees), Small firms (10-49 employees), Medium firms (50-249 employees) 
and Large firms (≥ 250 employees). According to the existing evidence in the literature, 
we expect a positive relationship between firm size and the probability of receiving a 
subsidy. In fact, most studies find that firm size positively affects the probability of 
receiving a subsidy (e.g., Czarnitzki and Fier, 2002; Duguet, 2004; Gonzalez et al., 
2005), although a negative effect of firm size has been reported by Busom (2000) for 
the Spanish case. We have also included the Age of the firm as an indicator of the firms’ 
maturity and experience. Age was measured by the logarithm of a firm’s age at the time 
of the application (in years). Whether age plays an important role in the probability of 
receiving subsidies is controversial in literature, with some authors finding a positive 
effect of the firm’s age (e.g., Busom, 2000) and others finding no statistically 
significant effect in the probability of receiving a subsidy (e.g., Almus and Czarnitzki, 
2003).  The firms’ ownership was analysed in terms of the presence of foreign capital. 
Foreign ownership of the firm, whether total or partial, has been found in former studies 
to reduce the probability of receiving a subsidy (e.g., Herrera and Nieto, 2008). These 
authors have also found that public ownership influences the probability of receiving a 
subsidy, however we could not obtain that information for firms in our sample. In order 
to control for sectoral differences we have also included fifteen industry dummies. 
In what concerns project-related variables, we have included the log amount of 
investment the submitted project requires, a part of which will be subsidised (real 
subsidy rates vary according to several factors such as the type of project, promoter 
characteristics, and the type of foreseen expenses). We have also included control 
variables for the type of project submitted, following the categories described in 
Chapter 4. Further control variables include dummies for each year of application, 
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ranging from 2007 to 2012, and region dummies concerning the regional focus of the 
project: Norte, Centro, Alentejo or Multi-Regional. Table 15 sums up the variables 
used. 
 
Table 15. Description of the independent variables (SI I&DT) 
Variable Description 
Promoter-Related Variables 
Dimension  
Micro 1 if the promoter is a micro firm (<10 employees) 
Small 1 if the promoter is a small firm (10-49 employees) 
Medium 1 if the promoter is a medium firm (50-249 employees) 
Large 1 if the promoter is a large firm (≥ 250 employees) 
Age Log age of the promoter at the time of application (in years) 
Foreign 1 if the firm is owned by foreign capital 
Industry  
Agro 1 if the firm belongs to the Agriculture, Forest and Fisheries industry 
Mining 1 if the firm belongs to the Mining industry 
Food 1 if the firm belongs to the Food and Beverages industry 
Textile 1 if the firm belongs to the Textiles and Clothing industry 
Wood 1 if the firm belongs to the Wood, Paper and Furniture industry 
Petrochemical 1 if the firm belongs to the Petroleum, Chemicals and Plastics industry 
Pharmaceutical 1 if the firm belongs to the Pharmaceuticals industry 
Non-metals 1 if the firm belongs to the Non-metallic materials industry 
Metals 1 if the firm belongs to the Metals industry 
Machinery 1 if the firm belongs to the Machinery, Electrical Equipment and Transports 
industry 
Electronics 1 if the firm belongs to the Electronics and Computers industry 
Energy & Waste 1 if the firm belongs to the Energy and Waste Management industry 
Construction 1 if the firm belongs to the Construction and Engineering industry 
Services 1 if the firm belongs to the Services industry 
Scientific R&D 1 if the firm belongs to the Scientific Research and Development industry 
Other 1 if the firm belongs to the other industries 
Project-Related Variables 
Investment Amount Log of amount of applied investment (inflation adjusted) 
Type of Project/Subsidy  
Individual 1 if the application was made for an individual R&D project  
Cooperation 1 if the application was made for a cooperation R&D project 
Mobilising 1 if the application was made for a mobilising R&D project 
Voucher 1 if the application was made for a R&D voucher 
Special Regime 1 if the application was made for a special regime project 
Collective R&D 1 if the application was made for a collective R&D project 
R&D Unit 1 if the application was made for implementing a R&D unit 
R&D Centre   1 if the application was made for a R&D centre 
Application Year   
2007 1 if the project application was made in 2007 
2008 1 if the project application was made in 2008 
2009 1 if the project application was made in 2009 
2010 1 if the project application was made in 2010 
2011 1 if the project application was made in 2011 
2012 1 if the project application was made in 2012 
Regional Focus   
Norte 1 if the project is carried out in the Norte region 
Centro 1 if the project is carried out in the Centro region 
Alentejo 1 if the project is carried out in the Alentejo region 
Multi-Region 1 if the project is carried out in more than 1 region 
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5.2.2. Estimation Results 
In order to estimate the effect of firm and project characteristics on the 
probability of receiving an R&D subsidy we used a probit model. The dependent 
variable Approved is a binary variable, which equals one if the promoter was awarded 
funding and equals zero if the promoter did not receive funding.  
In order to estimate the probit we had to omit from the analysis all special 
regime projects, which predict success perfectly since all have been approved (5 
observations dropped). We have also omitted Collective R&D Projects due to 
collinearity issues (7 observations dropped). Therefore, the following analysis concerns 
1189 applications to the SI I&DT subsidy programme. Table 16 shows the results of the 
probit model.
24
  
 
Table 16. Probit estimation results of receiving a R&D subsidy (SI I&DT), Portugal, 
2007-2012 (N=1189) 
Dependent Variable: Approved=1 
 
Coefficient Standard Error 
Firm Size (omitted category: Large) 
Micro -0,3357* 0,1978 
Small -0,5281*** 0,1643 
Medium -0,0461 0,0969 
 
  
 Age -0,0205 0,0394 
Foreign Capital 0,1031 0,1333 
   
  Industry (omitted category: Energy & Waste) 
Agro 0,3775 0,5276 
Mining 0,1987 0,6173 
Food 1,1847*** 0,3245 
Textiles 1,1787*** 0,3078 
Wood 0,7491** 0,3066 
Petrochemical 0,8649*** 0,3002 
Pharmaceutical 1,2652* 0,7112 
Non-metals 0,9037*** 0,3213 
Metals 1,0331** 0,3004 
Machinery 1,0586*** 0,2875 
Electronics 0,8945*** 0,2841 
Construction 0,6868** 0,2954 
Services 0,6258** 0,3119 
Scientific R&D 0,7033** 0,3031 
Others 0,6963* 0,3593 
   
  Investment Amount 0,1190** 0,0573 
   
  Type of Project (omitted category: Individual) 
Cooperation -0,1851 0,1174 
Mobilising 0,2595 0,4838 
Voucher 1,1264*** 0,2391 
                                                        
24
 Marginal effects are computed in table A.2 of the Appendix. 
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Dependent Variable: Approved=1 
 
Coefficient Standard Error 
R&D Unit 0,5044** 0,2417 
R&D Centre -0,5091 0,6509 
   
  
Region (omitted category: Multi-regional) 
Norte 0,0274 0,1266 
Centro 0,0413 0,1396 
Alentejo -0,1820 0,2323 
   
  Year of application (omitted category: 2012) 
2007 -0,1884 0,9155 
2008 0,0196 0,1601 
2009 0,4366*** 0,1555 
2010 0,5934*** 0,2211 
2011 -0,0143 0,1558 
   
  Constant -2,2585*** 0,8510 
LR Chi2(34) = 147,91 
Prob > chi2 = 0,0000 
Pseudo R2 = 0,0925 
Log likelihood = -725,60 
*, ** and *** denote statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Moreover, based on the probit estimates, we also estimated the probability of 
project approval by industry, by firm size and type of project (table 17).
25
  
 
Table 17: Probit results: estimated probability of project approval by industry
a 
 
Individual Projects Cooperation Projects 
  
Large 
Firms 
Medium 
Firms 
Large 
Firms 
Medium 
Firms 
Small 
Firms 
Micro 
Firms 
Agro 0,5400 0,5216 0,4662 0,4479 0,2700 0,3371 
Mining 0,4687 0,4504 0,3961 0,3784 0,2143 0,2745 
Food  0,8179 0,8055 0,7650 0,7506 0,5770 0,6505 
Textiles  0,8163 0,8038 0,7631 0,7486 0,5747 0,6483 
Wood 0,6815 0,6649 0,6129 0,5951 0,4046 0,4805 
Petrochemical 0,7216 0,7059 0,6564 0,6392 0,4500 0,5266 
Pharmaceutical 0,8385 0,8269 0,7890 0,7754 0,6083 0,6798 
Non-metals 0,7345 0,7192 0,6705 0,6537 0,4654 0,5421 
Metals 0,7752 0,7611 0,7159 0,7001 0,5170 0,5929 
Machinery 0,7827 0,7689 0,7245 0,7089 0,5272 0,6028 
Electronics  0,7315 0,7161 0,6672 0,6503 0,4618 0,5384 
Energy & Waste  0,3908 0,3732 0,3219 0,3056 0,1610 0,2124 
Construction  0,6589 0,6419 0,5888 0,5708 0,3807 0,4557 
Services 0,6363 0,6188 0,5649 0,5467 0,3577 0,4316 
Scientific R&D 0,6650 0,6480 0,5952 0,5772 0,3870 0,4623 
Other 0,6624 0,6454 0,5925 0,5745 0,3843 0,4595 
a 
Reference group: 2009=1; Norte=1; Foreign=0; mean Age; mean Investment Amount  
 
Regarding the firm size, our results show a statistically significant positive 
relationship. As expected, the estimates show that small firms are less likely to obtain a 
                                                        
25
 For results with the confidence intervals, see table A.3 of the Appendix. 
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subsidy than large firms. Results also show that the probability of project approval is 
lower for medium firms when compared to large firms across all industries, although 
less markedly. Larger firms are more likely to have organised in-house R&D 
departments, and more critical mass of R&D activities than smaller firms, therefore they 
are more likely to meet the quality requirements of the public agency in project 
applications. However, our results also show that, while micro firms have lower 
probabilities of project approval than medium or large firms, they have consistently 
higher probabilities of receiving a subsidy than small firms (table 17). This apparent 
preference for micro firms may reflect an attempt of the public agency to encourage 
R&D in firms that are less likely to have the necessary resources to perform R&D 
without incentives (because of the high fixed costs that R&D activities entail and the 
credit constraints faced by micro firms), and to encourage R&D in start-up firms.  
Analysing the estimated probabilities of project approval by industry, the results 
show that there are considerable differences across industries. Firms in manufacturing 
industries show a higher probability of approval than firms in the primary or tertiary 
sectors (figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. Probit results: estimated probability of project approval by industry
a 
 
a 
Reference group: Cooperation=1; 2009=1; Norte=1; Foreign=0; mean Age; mean Investment Amount 
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The energy and waste sectors show the lowest probabilities of approval, 
followed by the primary sector activities such as agriculture, forest and fisheries and 
mining. Firms in the pharmaceutical industry have the highest probability of receiving a 
subsidy. This is a common finding in the empirical literature (e.g., Busom, 2000) 
usually attributed to the acknowledgement that in research fields such as health and 
pharmaceuticals there is a higher gap between private and social returns.  
Among manufacturing industries, the probability of approval seems to increase 
with the technological intensity of the industry,
26
 with two exceptions – food and 
beverages and textiles and clothing (figure 7).  
 
Figure 7. Probit results: estimated probability of project approval in manufacturing 
industries
a 
 
a
 Reference group: Cooperation=1; 2009=1; Norte=1; Foreign=0; mean Age; mean Investment Amount 
 
Since the technological intensity of an industry reflects its direct R&D intensity, 
it is not surprising that there appears to be a positive correlation with the probability of 
project approval. In the empirical literature on this subject, experience in R&D and 
regularity of R&D activities, both at firm and industry level, have been found to 
                                                        
26
 The industries were rated according to the OECD classification, that consists of four classes – “High”, 
“Medium-high”, “Medium-Low” and “Low” – according to the industry’s direct R&D relative to value-
added and gross production (OECD, 2003).  
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increase the probability of receiving a subsidy (e.g., Fier et al., 2006; Herrera and Nieto, 
2008). Therefore, it seems likely that the public agency has a higher propensity to award 
R&D subsidies to firms in industries where there is already a higher intensity of R&D 
activities. 
However, our results show two exceptions - the food and beverages and the 
textiles and clothing industries which, usually being considered low-technology 
industries, are among the industries with higher probability of approval. One should 
note, first of all, that both of these industries include a large range of activities, some of 
which might have a high-technological potential. For example, advances in 
nanotechnologies have various potential applications in the textile industry, creating 
opportunities and challenges that require more intensive R&D activity in this industry 
(Sawhney et al., 2008). Furthermore, a possible explanation for this finding may be 
related with the importance of these industries in the national and regional economy. 
For instance, the textile and clothing industry is one of the most important industries in 
the Portuguese manufacturing. It is estimated that there are around 13,300 companies 
operating in all sectors of the textile and clothing industry in Portugal, accounting for 
20% of the manufacturing industry’s employment, 8% of the manufacturing industry’s 
turnover, and 9% of total exports (AICEP, 2013). Most textile companies in Portugal 
are located in the Norte region (especially in Porto, Braga and in the Vale do Ave textile 
cluster), with some relevance in the Centro region as well. Given the prominence of the 
textile and clothing industry in Portugal, especially in the “convergence regions”, which 
are the focus of this R&D policy instrument, it is conceivable that the public agency 
may positively discriminate projects in such industries, with the purpose of fostering 
innovation and modernisation in key regional sectors. 
Concerning project-related variables, our estimations show that a higher 
required investment increases the likelihood that the project is approved. Considering 
that the subsidy programme as a whole has a limited budget, this result suggests that the 
public agency prefers to concentrate financial efforts in fewer projects with higher 
potential impact.  
In what concerns project types, we have found that projects submitted for R&D 
vouchers are more likely to be approved, as well as projects that comprise the 
installation of permanent R&D units on SMEs. Given the simplistic features of the 
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voucher instrument and its low-budget, it was expected that the project evaluation and 
subsidy awarding process was subject to less bureaucracy and selectivity, resulting in a 
higher approval rate compared to larger investment projects.     
Cooperation projects do not show up as a statistically significant variable in our 
analysis. However, table 17 shows that cooperation projects have lower probabilities of 
receiving a subsidy than individual projects in the large and medium firm samples, 
across all industries. Cooperative behavior has been shown to increase the probability of 
receiving subsidies in former studies (e.g., Feldman and Kelley, 2006), however this is 
not the case for our sample of applications to the R&D subsidy programme. Therefore, 
despite that fostering cooperation is one of the specified objetives of the SI I&DT 
programme and that firms’ participation in this typology have been considerable (as 
shown by the project applications data), is seems that the public agency has not 
specifically favoured cooperation projects when awarding the subsidy. However we 
would like to note that, among approved cooperation projects, there is a large 
prevalence of projects involving firms and S&T organisations (table 18). Since 
information on co-promoters was not available for all applications, we could not 
introduce this variable in our model to test the effect of this specific type of cooperation 
on the probability of project approval. 
 
Table 18. Approved cooperation projects by types of co-promoters involved (SI I&DT)
 
Co-promoters
a No. of approved 
projects 
Only Firms 17 
Firms + Business Associations 49 
Firms + S&T Organisations 213 
Firms + Non Profit Organisations 16 
Total 296 
a 
Whenever a project includes at least two co-promoters from different categories and, additionally, a non-
profit organisation, we have disregarded the non-profit organisation for classification purposes.  
 
Projects submitted in 2009 and 2010 are more likely to be approved than more 
recent projects, which may reflect budget constraints in more recent years. 
Unlike the results reported in the empirical literature for leader countries, our 
findings show that the public agency in Portugal shows no preference for supporting 
domestic firms. This is in line with the general policy goal to attract foreign direct 
investment and, specifically, to support international R&D collaboration and R&D 
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units, as established in the COMPETE agenda (COMPETE, 2012). Therefore, it seems 
likely that foreign direct investment plays a more important role in follower countries, 
leading public agencies not to discriminate between domestic and foreign-owned firms 
when awarding R&D subsidies. 
Other variables, such as age or the regional focus of the project were found not 
to be statistically significant in our sample.       
 
5.3. S&T Organisations’ Participation in R&D Subsidy Programmes 
5.3.1. Variables Description  
Similarly to the SI&DT case, the chosen variables for our analysis of S&T 
organisations’ project approval include promoter and project-related variables. 
In what concerns promoter-related variables we have included eight dummy 
variables for the types of promoter that have been described in Chapter 4. To control for 
differences between research fields we have included 26 scientific areas dummies, 
based on the FCT classification of Scientific Domains and Areas.  
Regarding project-related variables, we have included the logarithm of the 
amount of investment the submitted project requires (Investment); type of project 
dummies; year of application dummies, ranging from 2008 to 2011, and region 
dummies concerning the regional focus of the project. Table 19 sums up the variables 
used in the estimation for the SAESCTN case. 
 
Table 19. Description of the independent variables (SAESCTN) 
Promoter-Related Variables 
Variable Description 
Type of Promoter  
University 1 if the promoter is a public university 
Assoc. Lab 1 if the promoter is an associate lab 
Polytechnic 1 if the promoter is a polytechnic institute 
Other HE 1 if the promoter is other higher education agency 
Pub. Lab 1 if the promoter is a public laboratory 
Pub. Hospital 1 if the promoter is a public hospital 
Other Gov 1 if the promoter is another government agency 
Non-Profit 1 if the promoter is a non profit organisation 
Scientific Areas  
Health 1 if the project concerns R&D in Medical and Health Sciences 
Sports 1 if the project concerns R&D in Sports Sciences 
Chemistry 1 if the project concerns R&D in Chemistry and Chemical Engineering 
Electrical Eng. 1 if the project concerns R&D in Electrical and Computer Engineering 
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Materials 1 if the project concerns R&D in Materials Science and Engineering 
Mechanical Eng. 1 if the project concerns R&D in Mechanical Engineering 
Civil Eng. 1 if the project concerns R&D in Civil and Mining Engineering 
Physics 1 if the project concerns R&D in Physics 
Biotechnology 1 if the project concerns R&D in Biotechnology 
Mathematics 1 if the project concerns R&D in Mathematics 
Energy & Transp 1 if the project concerns R&D in Energy and Transports 
ICT 1 if the project concerns R&D in Communication and Information Sciences 
Biology 1 if the project concerns R&D in Biological Sciences 
Environmental 1 if the project concerns R&D in Environmental Sciences 
Agrosciences 1 if the project concerns R&D in Agricultural and Forestry Sciences 
Marine Sc. 1 if the project concerns R&D in Marine Science and Technology 
Veterinary 1 if the project concerns R&D in Animal and Veterinarian Sciences 
Geosciences 1 if the project concerns R&D in Geosciences 
Economics 1 if the project concerns R&D in Business and Economics 
Education 1 if the project concerns R&D in Education and Political Sciences 
Psychology 1 if the project concerns R&D in Psychology 
History 1 if the project concerns R&D in History 
Arts 1 if the project concerns R&D in Arts 
Law 1 if the project concerns R&D in Law and Political Sciences 
Architecture 1 if the project concerns R&D in Architecture 
Other Social Sc. 1 if the project concerns R&D in other Social Sciences 
Other 1 if the project concerns R&D in other areas 
Promoter-Related Variables 
Variable Description 
Investment Amount Log of amount of applied investment (inflation adjusted) 
Type of Project/Subsidy 
Individual 1 if the application was made for an individual R&D project  
Cooperation 1 if the application was made for a cooperation R&D project 
S&T Culture 
1 if the application was made for a science and technology culture promotion 
project 
Individual Strategic 1 if the application was made for an individual strategic R&D project 
Cooperation 
Strategic 
1 if the application was made for a cooperation strategic R&D project 
Application Year  
2008 1 if the project application was made in 2008 
2009 1 if the project application was made in 2009 
2010 1 if the project application was made in 2010 
2011 1 if the project application was made in 2011 
Regional Focus  
Norte 1 if the project is carried out in the Norte region 
Centro 1 if the project is carried out in the Centro region 
Alentejo 1 if the project is carried out in the Alentejo region 
Multi-Region 1 if the project is carried out in more than 1 region 
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5.3.2. Estimation Results  
Once again we have used a probit model to estimate the effect of the 
organisation and project characteristics on the probability of receiving an R&D subsidy. 
The dependent variable, Approved, is a binary variable, which equals one if the 
promoter was awarded funding and zero otherwise.  
Some variables that predicted success or failure perfectly were dropped from our 
analysis. Specifically, we have excluded projects applied in 2008, which have all been 
approved (692 observations); both individual and cooperative strategic projects, which 
have also all been approved (71 observations); and Other Gov projects which have all 
been rejected (3 observations). Therefore, the SAESCTN dataset includes 7.641 project 
applications. Table 20 shows the results of the probit model.
27
 
 
Table 20. Probit estimation results of receiving a R&D subsidy (SAESCTN),  
Portugal, 2009-2011 (N=7641) 
Dependent Variable: Approved=1 
 
Coefficient Standard Error 
Promoter (Omitted category: Public University) 
Associate Lab 0,2362*** 0,0512 
Polytechnic -0,2907*** 0,0812 
Other Higher Education -0,5313*** 0,2039 
Public Laboratory 0,0801 0,1673 
Public Hospital -0,5829* 0,2993 
Non-Profit  -0,0287 0,0873 
 
Scientific Area (Omitted category: Physics) 
Health -0,6669*** 0,0963 
Sports -0,4992*** 0,1620 
Chemistry -0,5578*** 0,1067 
Electrical Engineering -0,5887*** 0,1086 
Materials -0,5097*** 0,1161 
Mechanical Engineering -0,4253*** 0,1161 
Civil Engineering -0,5162*** 0,1283 
Biotechnology -0,8366*** 0,1462 
Mathematics -0,2985* 0,1593 
Energy & Transports -0,7095*** 0,1847 
ICT -0,3513** 0,1764 
Biology -0,6715*** 0,1104 
Environmental -0,5562*** 0,1103 
Agrosciences -0,5326*** 0,1170 
Marine Sciences -0,5243*** 0,1274 
Veterinary -0,6601*** 0,1539 
Geosciences -0,4804*** 0,1783 
Economics -0,5773*** 0,1345 
Education -0,3986*** 0,1333 
Psychology -0,6028*** 0,1401 
                                                        
27
 Marginal effects are computed in table A.4 of the Appendix. 
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Dependent Variable: Approved=1 
 
Coefficient Standard Error 
History -0,4839*** 0,1643 
Arts -0,6162*** 0,2196 
Law -0,4989** 0,2134 
Architecture -0,3926* 0,2286 
Other Social Sciences -0,6396*** 0,1251 
Other -0,4759 0,2731 
   
Investment Amount 0,1251*** 0,0401 
  
 
Type of Project (Omitted category: Individual) 
Cooperation 0,2926*** 0,0455 
S&T Culture -0,0126 0,3917 
  
  Region (Omitted category: Multi-regional) 
Norte 0,7435*** 0,0578 
Centro 0,7254*** 0,0611 
Alentejo 0,5940*** 0,1160 
  
  Year of Application 
2009 0,2913*** 0,0396 
2010 0,8810*** 0,2463 
  
  Constant -274,032 0,4781 
LR chi2(40) = 405,83 
Prob > chi2 = 0,0000 
Pseudo R2 = 0,0549 
Log likelihood = -3495,1619 
*, ** and *** denote statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
The estimation results show that several variables have a statistically significant 
effect on the probability of receiving a subsidy. 
Among the types of promoter considered, we find that associate laboratories are 
more likely to receive a subsidy than public universities, while polytechnic institutes 
and other higher education agencies are less likely to be awarded a subsidy.  
In what concerns the project dimension, proxied by the total amount of 
investment, we find that there is a positive statistically significant relationship between 
the required investment and project approval, as was the case in the firm-oriented 
programme. It is likely that, to some extent, this variable is also capturing the effects of 
the promoter’s size, which we were not able to control for.  
One important difference in the S&T organisations case, compared to the 
SI&DT case, is that our results show that cooperation projects are more likely to be 
approved than individual projects. This finding might result from a deliberate purpose 
of the public agency in promoting linkages between organisations. However, an 
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overview of the approved cooperation projects shows that these are mainly projects 
involving two or more S&T organisations, while firms only participate in 3% of the 
approved cooperation projects under the SAESCTN (table 21).
28
  
 
Table 21. Approved cooperation projects by types of co-promoters involved 
(SAESCTN)
 
Co-promoters
a 
No. of approved projects 
Only S&T Organisations  755 
     Only Universities 636 
     University and Government 119 
S&T Organisations + Firms 22 
S&T Organisations + Business Associations 22 
S&T Organisations + Non Profit Organisations 43 
Total 842 
a 
Whenever a project includes at least two co-promoters from different categories and, additionally, a non-
profit organisation, we have disregarded the non-profit organisation for classification purposes.  
 
The regional scope results show that projects undertaken in multiple regions are 
less likely to receive a subsidy that projects undertaken exclusively in one region. 
Furthermore, while the differences are not very large, it appears that projects in the 
Norte region have a slightly higher probability of approval, followed by Centro and 
Alentejo (table 22). We argue that a possible reason for these regional differences has to 
do with the location of the public universities eligible under the SAESCTN and their 
comparative performance and scientific productivity, as Geuna (1998) has showed this 
to be a significant factor in subsidy awarding to S&T organisations. The main eligible 
public universities are located in the Norte region (Universidade do Porto and 
Universidade do Minho) and in the Centro region (Universidade de Coimbra and 
Universidade de Aveiro). Of these, only the Universidade do Porto and the 
Universidade de Coimbra show up in the Academic Ranking of World Universities 
2014,
 29
 ranked in the 301-400 and 401-500 positions respectively, which is in line with 
                                                        
28
 We could only obtain information on co-promoters for projects that received the subsidy, but not for all 
project applications. Therefore we cannot conclude whether this result is due to a low number of joint 
applications involving firms and S&T organisations or because of the public agency’s decision, although 
the first case seems more probable.  
29
 The Academic Ranking of World Universities evaluates universities worldwide according to several 
indicators of academic and research performance, including alumni and staff winning Nobel Prizes and 
Fields Medals, highly cited researchers, papers published in Nature and Science, papers indexed in major 
citation indices, and the per capita academic performance of an institution. Data available at 
http://www.shanghairanking.com/ (accessed 12-09-2014). 
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our conjectures. However, a more definitive analysis would require a comparable 
performance indicator for every promoter, which could not be obtained for our sample. 
Projects submitted earlier in the timeframe of the programme, namely in 2009 
and 2010 are more likely to be approved than later submissions. 
There are some considerable differences on the estimated probability of project 
approval across scientific areas. Exact sciences such as Physics and Mathematics have 
the higher probabilities of project approval, followed by Communication and 
Information Sciences. On the social sciences areas, research projects in Education and 
Political Sciences have the highest probabilities of approval. Our results also show that 
life sciences such as Health, Biology or Biotechnology exhibit the lowest probabilities 
of approval (table 22).
30
  
 
Table 22. Probit results: estimated probability of project approval by scientific areas
a 
 
Individual Cooperation 
 
Norte Centro Alentejo 
Multi-
Regional 
Norte Centro Alentejo 
Multi-
Regional 
Health 0,1846 0,1798 0,1475 0,0504 0,2725 0,2665 0,2252 0,0887 
Sports 0,2326 0,2271 0,1895 0,0703 0,3308 0,3243 0,2786 0,1188 
Chemistry 0,2151 0,2099 0,1740 0,0627 0,3098 0,3035 0,2592 0,1075 
Electrical Eng. 0,2062 0,2011 0,1662 0,0590 0,2990 0,2928 0,2493 0,1019 
Materials 0,2294 0,2240 0,1867 0,0689 0,3270 0,3205 0,2750 0,1167 
Mechanical Eng. 0,2558 0,2500 0,2102 0,0808 0,3580 0,3513 0,3039 0,1341 
Civil Eng, 0,2275 0,2220 0,1849 0,0680 0,3247 0,3182 0,2729 0,1154 
Physics 0,4086 0,4016 0,3518 0,1649 0,5245 0,5173 0,4650 0,2476 
Biotechnology 0,1429 0,1388 0,1118 0,0351 0,2192 0,2139 0,1776 0,0644 
Mathematics 0,2982 0,2920 0,2486 0,1015 0,4063 0,3993 0,3496 0,1634 
Energy & Transp. 0,1735 0,1689 0,1379 0,0461 0,2585 0,2527 0,2126 0,0820 
ICT 0,2802 0,2741 0,2321 0,0924 0,3860 0,3791 0,3302 0,1507 
Biology 0,1834 0,1786 0,1464 0,0499 0,2709 0,2650 0,2238 0,0880 
Environmental 0,2156 0,2103 0,1744 0,0629 0,3104 0,3041 0,2597 0,1078 
Agrosciences 0,2226 0,2172 0,1806 0,0659 0,3188 0,3124 0,2675 0,1123 
Marine Sc, 0,2250 0,2197 0,1828 0,0670 0,3218 0,3153 0,2702 0,1139 
Veterinary 0,1864 0,1816 0,1490 0,0511 0,2747 0,2687 0,2272 0,0898 
Geosciences 0,2384 0,2329 0,1947 0,0729 0,3377 0,3311 0,2849 0,1226 
Economics 0,2094 0,2043 0,1691 0,0604 0,3030 0,2967 0,2529 0,1040 
Education 0,2645 0,2586 0,2180 0,0849 0,3680 0,3612 0,3133 0,1399 
Psychology 0,2022 0,1971 0,1627 0,0574 0,2942 0,2880 0,2449 0,0994 
History 0,2373 0,2318 0,1937 0,0724 0,3364 0,3298 0,2837 0,1218 
Arts 0,1984 0,1934 0,1595 0,0558 0,2896 0,2834 0,2407 0,0971 
Law 0,2327 0,2272 0,1896 0,0703 0,3309 0,3244 0,2787 0,1188 
Architecture 0,2664 0,2605 0,2197 0,0858 0,3703 0,3635 0,3154 0,1413 
Other Social Sc, 0,1920 0,1871 0,1538 0,0532 0,2816 0,2755 0,2334 0,0932 
Other 0,2398 0,2342 0,1959 0,0735 0,3393 0,3327 0,2864 0,1235 
a
 Reference group: University=1; 2009=1; average Investment Amount 
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 For results with the confidence intervals, see table A.5 of the Appendix. 
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion and Future Research 
 
In this dissertation, we have proposed to analyse the participation of firms and 
S&T organisations in R&D subsidy programmes by identifying the determinants of 
obtaining a subsidy. We have used data from two R&D policy instruments in Portugal – 
the SI I&DT, which is directed to firms; and the SAESCTN, directed to S&T 
organisations. 
From the point of view of innovation and technological development, Portugal 
epitomises the case of a follower country, with a national innovation system in an 
intermediate stage of development and characterised by fast changes in the last decade. 
Particularly relevant distinctive features of this innovation system include the increasing 
domestic R&D expenditures, as well as the increasing public support to R&D activities; 
the persistent need for a higher participation of the business sector in R&D; the need of 
more systemic interactions between the science organisations and the business sector; 
and the need of structural change in the business sector from industries or activities that 
do not generate a strong demand for R&D to more knowledge-based activities. 
To study the determinants of receiving a subsidy in the analysed programmes we 
have applied a probit model of participation, where the dependent variable is the public 
agency’s decision to give a subsidy to a specific project or not.  
Regarding the firm-oriented subsidy programme, SI I&DT, we have found that 
subsidies are aimed mainly at manufacturing firms, both in high technology sectors and 
in low-tech sectors that are highly important in the national economy. Contrary to the 
observed for leader countries, the public agency in Portugal shows no preference 
between fully domestic and foreign-owned firms. We have also found some evidence 
that larger firms are more likely to receive a subsidy, although this result is hindered by 
the relatively low number of observations regarding smaller firms, given that the 
majority of micro and small firm R&D project applications were made to the Regional 
Operational Programmes and are out of the scope of our database. 
In what concerns SAESCTN, the subsidy programme oriented to S&T 
organisations, public university-based organisations and research centres have a higher 
probability of receiving a subsidy compared to other promoter typologies, as well as 
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S&T organisations conducting R&D projects in the exact sciences and engineering 
domains, and organisations involved in cooperation projects. 
In both instruments, projects that comprise a higher R&D investment have been 
privileged in subsidy attribution, although budget restrictions were imposed in some 
project typologies (particularly, in SAESCTN). Thus, we conclude that the public 
agency has opted to support mostly high investment projects made by firms, while the 
S&T organisations’ projects are much lower in magnitude, as made apparent by the 
average applied investment in both instruments (around 1.2 million euros for firm 
projects and 150 thousand euros for S&T organisation projects). 
In addition to these findings, we would like to make some concluding 
considerations that arise from the contextual analysis and our interpretation of results. 
First, when analysing the results for the SI I&DT and SAESCTN programmes in 
perspective with the evolution of the national innovation system in Portugal after their 
implementation in 2007, it becomes apparent that R&D policy has been an important 
driver for structural change, although limitations still persist. The SI I&DT has 
represented an unprecedented public effort in stimulating business R&D, and, it seems 
to have had a successful impact, given the discernible development of the business 
R&D sector in Portugal since 2007. The success of this instrument marks a shift to a 
more demand-pull logic of the R&D policy, focused on firms, and that is not only 
oriented for the stimulation of sectors with high technological content, but that also 
aims at inducing technological change in the traditional sectors that are among the most 
expressive in the national and regional production systems. The SAESCTN remained an 
important stimulus to R&D in the science and technology system, in a continuity logic 
with past technology-push policies, seemingly contributing to the consolidation of the 
higher education R&D sector observed in the last years. 
Second, the subsidy programme oriented for S&T organisations had a much 
higher degree of selectivity in the attribution of subsidies than the firm-oriented 
programme. This is evident in both programmes’ approval rates (26,2% for the 
SAESCTN and 60,37% for the SI I&DT), but also in the high selectivity of promoters 
in the SAESCTN, made evident by the fact that public universities and associate 
laboratories (which, in practice, are constituted by premium university-based research 
centres) show the highest probabilities of receiving a subsidy. This disparity in 
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selectivity can be explained by the different stages of development of the business 
sector and the S&T organisations as R&D performers in Portugal. As has been 
presented in chapter 3, the higher education and the government sectors are more 
mature sectors, with levels of R&D expenses in relation to the GDP that are similar to 
those of leader countries. On the other hand, only in the last decade have we observed 
an increased participation of the business sector in R&D activity, whose performance is 
still well below the EU average, but also shows the greatest growth potential. In this 
context, it is makes sense that, while the policies oriented to the S&T organisations 
aimed to consolidate the S&T system by focusing support in top institutions and key 
scientific areas, the public agency has adopted a strategy of broad promotion and 
support to R&D in the business sector, since firms’ R&D competences are in an earlier 
stage of development. This is further corroborated by the already reported result of high 
participation of low-tech sectors in the subsidy programme. This apparent intention to 
provide a broad support to business R&D, which in our opinion is an adequate policy 
decision in a follower country context, may therefore explain why our results 
concerning the influence of firm characteristics in the probability of receiving an R&D 
subsidy frequently contrast with those found in the literature for leader countries, which 
often report a higher propensity for the support of R&D in large, domestic, already 
highly innovative firms in high-technology sectors, i.e., a common pattern in a selective 
“picking-the-winner” policy strategy.       
Third, contrasting with the general policy strategy dispositions of the QREN in 
Portugal for the analysed period, our results regarding cooperation projects do not make 
evident that policy makers are following a proactive strategy to promote linkages 
between organisations, such as university-industry cooperation. While the SI I&DT data 
reveal a large expression of firms in cooperation projects, inclusively with S&T 
organisations, it seems that the public agency does not prefer to award the subsidy for a 
cooperation project rather than an individual project. In the SAESCTN, however, the 
public agency seems to show preference for cooperation projects, but these are mainly 
collaborations between S&T organisations, while firm participation is negligible. In this 
case, it is possible that the existence of a broad range of instruments for public support 
to R&D in all sectors has lowered the agents’ need to cooperate in order to develop 
R&D projects.  
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From this analysis we can draw some policy recommendations with particular 
relevance in the Portuguese context. First, there should be a more active promotion of 
cooperation between agents, particularly the promotion of university-industry linkages, 
in order to meet the policy goals of fostering knowledge and technology transfer 
between firms and S&T organisations. Second, there should continue to be a strong 
public support to business R&D, since, at this stage of development, firm R&D is the 
main driver for future development of the innovation and R&D system. Third, given the 
ultimate policy goal of structural change, there should be a high support to new 
technology-based firms. Our results do not allow us to conclude if this segment has 
been adequately targeted since most micro and small firms have received support 
through other programmes.  
Overall, we believe that this research has contributed to the literature on the 
determinants of participation in R&D subsidy programmes, especially by providing 
evidence for the case of a follower country, as well as establishing an analysis for both 
firms and S&T organisations.  However, our research has several limitations which may 
be addressed in future research efforts. 
As mentioned in chapter 2, a subsidy programme’s selection mechanism 
consists of two decision problems: first, whether promoters decide to apply for a 
subsidy or not; second, whether the public agency decides to award a subsidy or not. 
Given the available data, we could not approach the first decision problem, and had to 
focus our research in the public agency decision problem, although we have attempted 
to identify relevant features of promoters that have chosen to apply to the SI I&DT and 
SAESCTN by conducting a descriptive analysis of project applications data for these 
instruments. Therefore, further counterfactual evidence on the promoter decision to 
apply would be useful in order to complement and better understand our findings. 
Also, we have faced some limitations due to data inaccessibility. Besides the 
already reported issues regarding firm size, our models also lack variables that measure 
the applicants’ past R&D performance directly (e.g., level of R&D expenses, patent 
applications). 
Finally, we have focused solely in studying the subsidy allocation decision. In 
order to provide a more complete assessment of the policy instruments, the following 
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step in this research should be to investigate the effectiveness of the R&D subsidy 
programmes, so that the allocation decisions can be evaluated. 
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Table A.1. Correspondence between industry and CAE 
Industry CAE (Rev.3) 
Agriculture, Forest and Fisheries 01-03 
Mining 05-09 
Food and Beverages 10-11 
Textiles and Clothing 13-15 
Wood, Paper and Furniture 16-17; 31 
Petroleum, Chemicals and Plastics 19;20;22 
Pharmaceuticals 21 
Non-metallic materials 23 
Metals 24-25 
Machinery, Electrical Equipment and Transports 27-30;33;49-53 
Energy and Waste Management 35-39 
Construction and Engineering 41-43;71 
Electronics and Computers 26; 62-63 
Services 45-47 
Scientific Research and Development 72 
Other 32; 46; 47 
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Table A.2. SI I&DT, probit results: marginal effects.   
Dependent Variable: Approved=1 
 
Marginal Effects (Delta-method) 
 
dy/dx Standard Error 
Firm Size (omitted category: Large) 
Micro -0,1168* 0,0685 
Small -0,1837*** 0,0564 
Medium -0,0160 0,0337 
  
  Age -0,0071 0,0137 
Foreign Capital 0,0359 0,0463 
   
  Industry (omitted category: Energy & Waste) 
Agro 0,1313 0,1834 
Mining 0,0691 0,2147 
Food 0,4120*** 0,1110 
Textiles 0,4099*** 0,1052 
Wood 0,2605** 0,1059 
Petrochemical 0,3008*** 0,1034 
Pharmaceutical 0,4400* 0,2466 
Non-metals 0,3143*** 0,1107 
Metals 0,3593*** 0,1030 
Machinery 0,3682*** 0,0983 
Electronics 0,3111*** 0,0976 
Construction 0,2388** 0,1021 
Services 0,2176** 0,1080 
Scientific R&D 0,2446** 0,1047 
Other 0,2422* 0,1244 
   
  
Investment Amount 0,0414** 0,0198 
   
  Type of Project (omitted category: Individual) 
Cooperation -0,0644 0,0407 
Mobilising 0,0902 0,1682 
Voucher 0,3917*** 0,0810 
R&D Unit 0,1754** 0,0837 
R&D Centre -0,1770 0,2262 
   
  Region (omitted category: Multi-regional) 
Norte 0,0095 0,0440 
Centro 0,0144 0,0485 
Alentejo -0,0633 0,0807 
   
  Year of application (omitted category: 2012) 
2007 -0,0616 0,3182 
2008 0,0097 0,0557 
2009 0,1550*** 0,0536 
2010 0,2090*** 0,0762 
2011 -0,0038 0,0542 
*, ** and *** denote statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  
 68 
Table A.3. SI I&DT, probit results: estimated probability of project approval, with confidence intervals
a 
 
Individual Projects Cooperation Projects 
  
Large Firms Medium Firms Large Firms Medium Firms Small Firms Micro Firms 
  
Pr 
(y=1|x) 
95% C.I. 
Pr 
(y=1|x) 
95% C.I. 
Pr 
(y=1|x) 
95% C.I. 
Pr 
(y=1|x) 
95% C.I. 
Pr 
(y=1|x) 
95% C.I. 
Pr 
(y=1|x) 
95% C.I. 
Agro 0,5400 [0,1755 ; 0,9043] 0,5216 [0,1567 ; 0,8865] 0,4662 [0,0974 ; 0,8349] 0,4479 [0,0829 ; 0,8128] 0,2700 [-0,0496 ; 0,5895] 0,3371 [-0,0205 ; 0,6946] 
Mining 0,4687 [0,0255 ; 0,9118] 0,4504 [0,0103 ; 0,8904] 0,3961 [-0,0387 ; 0,8308] 0,3784 [-0,0487 ; 0,8055] 0,2143 [-0,1244 ; 0,5529] 0,2745 [-0,1014 ; 0,6503] 
Food  0,8179 [0,7029 ; 0,9328] 0,8055 [0,6862 ; 0,9247] 0,7650 [0,6288 ; 0,9011] 0,7506 [0,6125 ; 0,8885] 0,5770 [0,3733 ; 0,7806] 0,6505 [0,4393 ; 0,8615] 
Textiles  0,8163 [0,7207 ; 0,9119] 0,8038 [0,7091 ; 0,8984] 0,7631 [0,6435 ; 0,8827] 0,7486 [0,6328 ; 0,8644] 0,5747 [0,3923 ; 0,7569] 0,6483 [0,4578 ; 0,8387] 
Wood 0,6815 [0,5494 ; 0,8135] 0,6649 [0,5255 ; 0,8041] 0,6129 [0,4677 ; 0,7580] 0,5951 [0,4463 ; 0,7438] 0,4046 [0,2157 ; 0,5935] 0,4805 [0,2702 ; 0,6907] 
Petrochemical 0,7216 [0,6020 ; 0,8412] 0,7059 [0,5818 ; 0,8300] 0,6564 [0,5174 ; 0,7952] 0,6392 [0,4993 ; 0,7791] 0,4500 [0,2691 ; 0,6308] 0,5266 [0,3289 ; 0,7243] 
Pharmaceutical 0,8385 [0,5204 ; 1,1564] 0,8269 [0,4954 ; 1,1583] 0,7890 [0,4082 ; 1,1698] 0,7754 [0,3824 ; 1,1683] 0,6083 [0,0949 ; 1,1215] 0,6798 [0,1994 ; 1,1602] 
Non-metals 0,7345 [0,5943 ; 0,8746] 0,7192 [0,5728 ; 0,8654] 0,6705 [0,5118 ; 0,8291] 0,6537 [0,4919 ; 0,8153] 0,4654 [0,2605 ; 0,6703] 0,5421 [0,3181 ; 0,7659] 
Metals 0,7752 [0,6696 ; 0,8806] 0,7611 [0,6549 ; 0,8672] 0,7159 [0,5878 ; 0,8440] 0,7001 [0,5745 ; 0,8255] 0,5170 [0,3352 ; 0,6987] 0,5929 [0,3985 ; 0,7873] 
Machinery 0,7827 [0,6970 ; 0,8684] 0,7689 [0,6800 ; 0,8577] 0,7245 [0,6174 ; 0,8315] 0,7089 [0,6020 ; 0,8157] 0,5272 [0,3601 ; 0,6941] 0,6028 [0,4247 ; 0,7807] 
Electronics  0,7315 [0,6395 ; 0,8234] 0,7161 [0,6207 ; 0,8113] 0,6672 [0,5538 ; 0,7805] 0,6503 [0,5374 ; 0,7631] 0,4618 [0,2988 ; 0,6247] 0,5384 [0,3550 ; 0,7217] 
Energy & Waste  0,3908 [0,1772 ; 0,6043] 0,3732 [0,1568 ; 0,5896] 0,3219 [0,1180 ; 0,5258] 0,3056 [0,1026 ; 0,5084] 0,1610 [0,0033 ; 0,3186] 0,2124 [0,0148 ; 0,4099] 
Construction  0,6589 [0,5369 ; 0,7809] 0,6419 [0,5166 ; 0,7670] 0,5888 [0,4568 ; 0,7207] 0,5708 [0,4398 ; 0,7016] 0,3807 [0,2184 ; 0,5429] 0,4557 [0,2654 ; 0,6459] 
Services 0,6363 [0,4962 ; 0,7763] 0,6188 [0,4745 ; 0,7631] 0,5649 [0,4118 ; 0,7179] 0,5467 [0,3934 ; 0,6999] 0,3577 [0,1808 ; 0,5344] 0,4316 [0,2296 ; 0,6335] 
Scientific R&D 0,6650 [0,5312 ; 0,7987] 0,6480 [0,5122 ; 0,7838] 0,5952 [0,4514 ; 0,7390] 0,5772 [0,4355 ; 0,7189] 0,3870 [0,2093 ; 0,5646] 0,4623 [0,2656 ; 0,6588] 
Other 0,6624 [0,4704 ; 0,8544] 0,6454 [0,4501 ; 0,8407] 0,5925 [0,3868 ; 0,7981] 0,5745 [0,3692 ; 0,7797] 0,3843 [0,1563 ; 0,6122] 0,4595 [0,2218 ; 0,6971] 
a 
Reference group: 2009=1; Norte=1; Foreign=0; average Age; average Investment Amount  
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Table A.4. SAESCTN, probit results: marginal effects.   
Dependent Variable: Approved=1 
 
Marginal Effects (Delta-method) 
 
dy/dx Standard Error 
Promoter (Omitted category: Public University) 
Associate Lab 0,0603*** 0,0130 
Polytechnic -0,0742*** 0,0207 
Other Higher Education -0,1356*** 0,0520 
Public Laboratory 0,0205 0,0427 
Public Hospital -0,1488* 0,0764 
Non-Profit  -0,0073 0,0223 
 
Scientific Area (Omitted category: Physics) 
Health -0,1702*** 0,0244 
Sports -0,1274*** 0,0413 
Chemistry -0,1423*** 0,0271 
Electrical Engineering -0,1502*** 0,0276 
Materials -0,1301*** 0,0295 
Mechanical Engineering -0,1085*** 0,0296 
Civil Engineering -0,1317*** 0,0327 
Biotechnology -0,2135*** 0,0371 
Mathematics -0,0762* 0,0406 
Energy & Transports -0,1811*** 0,0470 
ICT -0,0897** 0,0450 
Biology -0,1714*** 0,0280 
Environmental -0,1419*** 0,0280 
Agrosciences -0,1359*** 0,0297 
Marine Sciences -0,1338*** 0,0324 
Veterinary -0,1685*** 0,0392 
Geosciences -0,1226*** 0,0454 
Economics -0,1473*** 0,0342 
Education -0,1017*** 0,0340 
Psychology -0,1538*** 0,0357 
History -0,1235*** 0,0419 
Arts -0,1572*** 0,0560 
Law -0,1273** 0,0544 
Architecture -0,1002* 0,0583 
Other Social Sciences -0,1632*** 0,0318 
Other -0,1214* 0,0697 
   
Investment Amount 0,0319*** 0,0102 
 
Type of Project (Omitted category: Individual) 
Cooperation 0,0747 0,0115 
S&T Culture -0,0032 0,0999 
  
  Region (Omitted category: Multi-regional) 
Norte 0,1897*** 0,0145 
Centro 0,1851*** 0,0154 
Alentejo 0,1516*** 0,0295 
  
  Year of Application   
2009 0,0759*** 0,0100 
2010 0,2260*** 0,0627 
*, ** and *** denote statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% l evel, respectively. 
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Table A.5. SAESCTN, probit results: estimated probability of project approval, with confidence intervals
a 
 
Pr (y=1|x) 
[95% confidence interval] 
 
Individual Cooperation 
 
Norte Centro Alentejo Multi-Regional Norte Centro Alentejo Multi-Regional 
Health 
0,1846 0,1798 0,1475 0,0504 0,2725 0,2665 0,2252 0,0887 
[0,1580; 0,2111] [0,1521; 0,2075] [0,0960; 0,1988] [0,0350; 0,0657] [0,2337; 0,3112] [0,2256; 0,3073] [0,1548; 0,2954] [0,0690; 0,1083] 
Sports 
0,2326 0,2271 0,1895 0,0703 0,3308 0,3243 0,2786 0,1188 
[0,1505; 0,3147] [0,1443; 0,3099] [0,0986; 0,2803] [0,0312; 0,1093] [0,2306; 0,4309] [0,2224; 0,4261] [0,1631; 0,3939] [0,0633; 0,1741] 
Chemistry 
0,2151 0,2099 0,1740 0,0627 0,3098 0,3035 0,2592 0,1075 
[0,1766; 0,2535] [0,1711; 0,2485] [0,1136; 0,2344] [0,0422; 0,0832] [0,2588; 0,3608] [0,2514; 0,3555] [0,1796; 0,3387] [0,0810; 0,1340] 
Electrical 
Engineering 
0,2062 0,2011 0,1662 0,0590 0,2990 0,2928 0,2493 0,1019 
[0,1672; 0,2451] [0,1605; 0,2416] [0,1064; 0,2260] [0,0386; 0,0794] [0,2479; 0,3501] [0,2391; 0,3464] [0,1703; 0,3282] [0,0752; 0,1286] 
Materials 
0,2294 0,2240 0,1867 0,0689 0,3270 0,3205 0,2750 0,1167 
[0,1805; 0,2782] [0,1754; 0,2725] [0,1181; 0,2552] [0,0439; 0,0938] [0,2660; 0,3879] [0,2590; 0,3820] [0,1872; 0,3628] [0,0841; 0,1492] 
Mechanical 
Engineering 
0,2558 0,2500 0,2102 0,0808 0,3580 0,3513 0,3039 0,1341 
[0,2044; 0,3071] [0,1987; 0,3013] [0,1373; 0,2829] [0,0525; 0,1090] [0,2954; 0,4205] [0,2879; 0,4146] [0,2128; 0,3949] [0,0982; 0,1699] 
Civil Engineering 
0,2275 0,2220 0,1849 0,0680 0,3247 0,3182 0,2729 0,1154 
[0,1693; 0,2855] [0,1636; 0,2804] [0,1111; 0,2587] [0,0402; 0,0958] [0,2531; 0,3962] [0,2455; 0,3908] [0,1786; 0,3670] [0,0782; 0,1526] 
Physics 
0,4086 0,4016 0,3518 0,1649 0,5245 0,5173 0,4650 0,2476 
[0,3383; 0,4789] [0,3331; 0,4701] [0,2527; 0,4508] [0,1146; 0,2151] [0,4479; 0,6011] [0,4414; 0,5932] [0,3546; 0,5752] [0,1887; 0,3065] 
Biotechnology 
0,1429 0,1388 0,1118 0,0351 0,2192 0,2139 0,1776 0,0644 
[0,0902; 0,1954] [0,0858; 0,1917] [0,0540; 0,1695] [0,0151; 0,0550] [0,1481; 0,2901] [0,1418; 0,2859] [0,0965; 0,2587] [0,0337; 0,0951] 
Mathematics 
0,2982 0,2920 0,2486 0,1015 0,4063 0,3993 0,3496 0,1634 
[0,2054; 0,3909] [0,2000; 0,3839] [0,1482; 0,3488] [0,0509; 0,1520] [0,3000; 0,5125] [0,2930; 0,5056] [0,2294; 0,4696] [0,0963; 0,2305] 
Energy & 
Transports 
0,1735 0,1689 0,1379 0,0461 0,2585 0,2527 0,2126 0,0820 
[0,0903; 0,2566] [0,0869; 0,2507] [0,0547; 0,2209] [0,0132; 0,0789] [0,1519; 0,3650] [0,1469; 0,3584] [0,1013; 0,3238] [0,0322; 0,1318] 
ICT 
0,2802 0,2741 0,2321 0,0924 0,3860 0,3791 0,3302 0,1507 
[0,1782; 0,3820] [0,1722; 0,3759] [0,1219; 0,3422] [0,0393; 0,1455] [0,2668; 0,5050] [0,2591; 0,4990] [0,1961; 0,4643] [0,0777; 0,2237] 
Biology 
0,1834 0,1786 0,1464 0,0499 0,2709 0,2650 0,2238 0,0880 
[0,1463; 0,2203] [0,1401; 0,2170] [0,0909; 0,2018] [0,0320; 0,0677] [0,2187; 0,3231] [0,2105; 0,3194] [0,1474; 0,3001] [0,0627; 0,1131] 
Environmental 
0,2156 0,2103 0,1744 0,0629 0,3104 0,3041 0,2597 0,1078 
[0,1735; 0,2576] [0,1685; 0,2520] [0,1127; 0,2361] [0,0412; 0,0845] [0,2564; 0,3643] [0,2495; 0,3585] [0,1792; 0,3402] [0,0798; 0,1357] 
a
 Reference group: University=1; 2009=1; average Investment Amount 
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Table A.5. SAESCTN, probit results: estimated probability of project approval, with confidence intervals (continued)
a 
 
Pr (y=1|x) 
[95% confidence interval] 
 
Individual Cooperation 
 Norte Centro Alentejo Multi-Regional Norte Centro Alentejo Multi-Regional 
Agrosciences 
0,2226 0,2172 0,1806 0,0659 0,3188 0,3124 0,2675 0,1123 
[0,1741; 0,2709] [0,1681; 0,2662] [0,1165; 0,2447] [0,0415; 0,0902] [0,2588; 0,3787] [0,2508; 0,3739] [0,1850; 0,3498] [0,0808; 0,1437] 
Marine Sciences 
0,2250 0,2197 0,1828 0,0670 0,3218 0,3153 0,2702 0,1139 
[0,1685; 0,2815] [0,1624; 0,2768] [0,1100; 0,2555] [0,0392; 0,0947] [0,2522; 0,3913] [0,2441; 0,3865] [0,1772; 0,3632] [0,0766; 0,1511] 
Veterinary 
0,1864 0,1816 0,1490 0,0511 0,2747 0,2687 0,2272 0,0898 
[0,1189; 0,2538] [0,1131; 0,2500] [0,0743; 0,2237] [0,0222; 0,0798] [0,1895; 0,3598] [0,1815; 0,3558] [0,1285; 0,3258] [0,0479; 0,1316] 
Geosciences 
0,2384 0,2329 0,1947 0,0729 0,3377 0,3311 0,2849 0,1226 
[0,1418; 0,3350] [0,1377; 0,3279] [0,0992; 0,2900] [0,0286; 0,1170] [0,2216; 0,4537] [0,2158; 0,4463] [0,1649; 0,4049] [0,0600; 0,1850] 
Economics 
0,2094 0,2043 0,1691 0,0604 0,3030 0,2967 0,2529 0,1040 
[0,1507; 0,2681] [0,1444; 0,2640] [0,0976; 0,2405] [0,0331; 0,0875] [0,2277; 0,3782] [0,2195; 0,3739] [0,1588; 0,3470] [0,0652; 0,1426] 
Education 
0,2645 0,2586 0,2180 0,0849 0,3680 0,3612 0,3133 0,1399 
[0,1980; 0,3308] [0,1921; 0,3249] [0,1392; 0,2966] [0,0500; 0,1196] [0,2865; 0,4494] [0,2789; 0,4435] [0,2139; 0,4125] [0,0927; 0,1871] 
Psychology 
0,2022 0,1971 0,1627 0,0574 0,2942 0,2880 0,2449 0,0994 
[0,1410; 0,2633] [0,1359; 0,2583] [0,0907; 0,2347] [0,0296; 0,0851] [0,2143; 0,3739] [0,2075; 0,3684] [0,1487; 0,3410] [0,0587; 0,1401] 
History 
0,2373 0,2318 0,1937 0,0724 0,3364 0,3298 0,2837 0,1218 
[0,1519; 0,3226] [0,1465; 0,3170] [0,1066; 0,2807] [0,0320; 0,1127] [0,2328; 0,4399] [0,2255; 0,4341] [0,1733; 0,3940] [0,0648; 0,1788] 
Arts 
0,1984 0,1934 0,1595 0,0558 0,2896 0,2834 0,2407 0,0971 
[0,0871; 0,3097] [0,0836; 0,3032] [0,0576; 0,2612] [0,0096; 0,1020] [0,1514; 0,4276] [0,1462; 0,4205] [0,1083; 0,3729] [0,0281; 0,1660] 
Law 
0,2327 0,2272 0,1896 0,0703 0,3309 0,3244 0,2787 0,1188 
[0,1140; 0,3514] [0,1109; 0,3435] [0,0727; 0,3064] [0,0163; 0,1242] [0,1872; 0,4745] [0,1825; 0,4662] [0,1309; 0,4264] [0,0403; 0,1972] 
Architecture 
0,2664 0,2605 0,2197 0,0858 0,3703 0,3635 0,3154 0,1413 
[0,1289; 0,4038] [0,1244; 0,3966] [0,0828; 0,3565] [0,0184; 0,1531] [0,2110; 0,5294] [0,2047; 0,5222] [0,1494; 0,4813] [0,0470; 0,2354] 
Other Social 
Sciences 
0,1920 0,1871 0,1538 0,0532 0,2816 0,2755 0,2334 0,0932 
[0,1413; 0,2425] [0,1371; 0,2369] [0,0907; 0,2169] [0,0304; 0,0760] [0,2146; 0,3484] [0,2087; 0,3422] [0,1483; 0,3184] [0,0604; 0,1258] 
Other 
0,2398 0,2342 0,1959 0,0735 0,3393 0,3327 0,2864 0,1235 
[0,0818; 0,3977] [0,0776; 0,3907] [0,0446; 0,3470] [0,0009; 0,1460] [0,1522; 0,5263] [0,1460; 0,5193] [0,0989; 0,4738] [0,0187; 0,2281] 
a
 Reference group: University=1; 2009=1; average Investment Amount 
 
